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5 <title>Триумфиращият анархизъм</title>
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11 <!-- base
12 href="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html"
13 -->
14
15 <!--
16 <meta name="Description" content="This paper shows why free software, far from
17 being a marginal participant in the commercial software market, is the
18 first step in the withering away of the intellectual property system.">
19 <meta name="Keywords" content="anarchism triumphant, free software, death of copyright, Linux operating system kernel, software as property, article">
20 <meta name="DC.Title" content="Anarchism triumphant">
21 <meta name="DC.Title" content="Free software and the death of copyright">
22 <meta name="DC.Creator" content="Moglen, Eben">
23 <meta name="DC.Subject" content="anarchism triumphant, free software, death of copyright, Linux operating system kernel, software as property, article">
24 <meta name="DC.Description" content="This paper shows why free software, far from being a marginal participant in the commercial software market, is the
25 first step in the withering away of the intellectual property system.">
26 <meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Valauskas, Edward J.">
27 <meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Dyson, Esther">
28 <meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Ghosh, Rishab Aiyer">
29 <meta name="DC.Date" content="1999-08-02">
30 <meta name="DC.Type" content="text">
31 <meta name="DC.Format" content="text/html">
32 <meta name="DC.Identifier" content="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html">
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34 <meta name="DC.Relation" content="IsPartOf First Monday, vol 4, no. 8"></head><body alink="#ffee99" bgcolor="#ffffff" link="#bb7777" text="#000000" vlink="#7777bb">
35
36<blockquote><img src="anarchism_files/logo.gif" alt="First Monday" align="bottom" border="0" height="40" width="256"><br>
37
38</blockquote>
39 -->
40
41
42 <para><ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html#author"><!-- <img src="anarchism_files/moglen.gif" alt="Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright" border="0">--> </ulink></para>
43
44 <blockquote><para>Разпространението на ядрото за операционни системи
45 Линукс насочи вниманието към движението за свободен софтуер. Това есе
46 показва защо свободният софтуер, който далеч не е нищожен участник в
47 пазара на комерсиален софтуер, е важната първа стъпка в премахването
48 на системата на интелектуална собственост.</para></blockquote>
49
50 <section>
51 <title>Софтуерът като собственост: Теоретичният парадокс</title>
52
53 <para><emphasis>Софтуер</emphasis>: никоя друга дума не въплъщава
54 толкова пълно рактическите и социалните ефекти на цифровата революция.
55 Първоначално терминът е бил чисто технически и е означавал частите на
56 една компютърна система, която за разлика от "хардуера" -- направен
57 непроменим от производителя си в електрониката на системата, е можел
58 свободно да бъде променян. Първият софтуер е представлявал начина на
59 включване на кабели и прекъсвачи на външните панели на електронни
60 устройства, но още с появата на езикови средства за промяната на
61 поведението на компютъра, "софтуер" започнал да обозначава предимно
62 изразяванията в повече или по-малко понятех за хората език, който
63 както описвал, така и контролирал поведението на машината<footnote>
64 <para>1. Тази отлика е била само приблизителна в първоначалния
65 контекст. В края на 60-те определена част от основните операции на
66 хардуера са контролирани от програми, които са цифрово кодирани в
67 електрониката на компютърното оборудване, които не могат да бъдат
68 променяни веднъж след като продукцията е излязла от фабриката. Такива
69 символни, но непроменими компоненти, са били известни като "микрокод"
70 на жаргона на индустрията, но стана обичайно те да се наричат
71 "фърмуеър". Изменчивостта, както бе показано от термина
72 "фърмуеър"<!-- БЕЛЕЖКА ЗА ЗНАЧЕНИЕТО НА КОРЕНИТЕ НА ДУМИТЕ СОФТУЕР,
73 ХАРДУЕР, ФЪРМУЕР -->,се отнася главно към възможността на
74 потребителите да изменят символите, които определят поведението на
75 машината. Понеже цифровата революция доведе до широката употреба на
76 компютрите от технически некомпетентни лица, повечето от традиционния
77 софтуер -- приложни програми, операционни системи, инструкции за
78 числово управление и т. н. -- е, за повечето от потребителите си,
79 фърмуер. Може да е символен, а не електронен в начина, по който е
80 направен, но те не могат да го променят, дори и да искат, нещо което
81 те често, но безсилно и с негодуванние правят. Това "затвърдяване на
82 софтуера" е основното условие на собственическия подход към законовата
83 организация на цифровото обществео, което е темата на този
84 доклад.</para></footnote>.</para>
85
86 <para>Така е било тогава, а сега е така: технологиите базирани на
87 обработката на информация кодирана в цифров вид сега е социално
88 доминираща в повечето аспекти на човешката култура в "развитите"
89 общества. <footnote><para>2. В рамките на сегашното поколение,
90 самата концепция за социално "равитие" се измества от притежанието
91 на индустрия основана на двигател с вътрешно горене към
92 "пост-индустрия" базирана на цифровите комуникации и свързаните с
93 тях форми на икономическа дейност, основани на
94 "знания".</para></footnote>. Преминаването от аналогово към
95 цифрово представяне -- във видеото, музиката, печатането,
96 телекомуникациите и дори хореографията, религиозните култове и
97 сексуалното задоволяване <!-- religious worship, sexual
98 gratification --> -- потенциално превръща всички форми на
99 човешката символна дейност във софтуер, то ест -- променими
100 инструкции за описание и управление на поведението на машините.
101 Чрез концептуално постформиране, характено за западното научно
102 мислене, разделението между хардуера и софтуера се наблюдава в
103 природния или социалния свят и е станал нов начин за изразяване на
104 конфликта между идеите на детерминизъм и свободата на волята
105 (действие?), природата и човека, или гените и културата. <!--
106 Какво е backformation? Аналог на transformation ли? Nature <->
107 Nurture, как е free will на български. By a conceptual
108 back-formation characteristic of Western scientistic thinking, the
109 division between hardware and software is now being observed in
110 the natural or social world, and has become a new way to express
111 the conflict between ideas of determinism and free will, nature
112 and nurture, or genes and culture. --> Нашият "хардуер", който е
113 генетично зададен е нашата природа и ни определя. Нашето
114 възпитание е "софтуера", който задава културното ни прграмиране,
115 което е нашата относителна свобода. И така нататък, за неразумно
116 дърдорещите. <!-- And so on, for those reckless of blather
117 -->.<footnote><para>3. Всъщност, едно бързо замисляне ще разкрие,
118 че нашите гени са фърмуеър. Еволюцията направи прехода от
119 аналогово към цифрово още преди периода на първите вкаменелости.
120 Но ние не притежавахме властта за управлявани, преки промени. До
121 завчера. През следващото столетие гените също ще се превърнат в
122 софтуер и въпреки че не разглеждам проблема по нататък в това есе,
123 политиеските последствия на несвободността на софтуера в този
124 контекст са още по-плашещи в сравнение с културните
125 артефакти.</para></footnote> Този "софтуер" се превръща в
126 жизнеспособна метафора за цялата символна активност, която
127 очевидно е разведена (еманципирана) от техническия контекст на
128 произхода на думата, въпреки неудобството, което се появява в
129 технически компетентните, когато термина влиза в устите на хората,
130 като се изпуска концептуалното значение на неговия
131 произход.<footnote><para>4. <emphasis>Виж напр.:</emphasis>
132 J. M. Balkin, 1998. <emphasis>Cultural Software: a Theory of
133 Ideology.</emphasis> New Haven: Yale University
134 Press.</para></footnote></para>
135
136
137 <para>But the widespread adoption of digital technology for use by
138 those who do not understand the principles of its operation, while it
139 apparently licenses the broad metaphoric employment of "software,"
140 does not in fact permit us to ignore the computers that are now
141 everywhere underneath our social skin. The movement from analog to
142 digital is more important for the structure of social and legal
143 relations than the more famous if less certain movement from status to
144 contract <footnote><para>5. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Henry Sumner
145 Maine, 1861. <emphasis>Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early
146 History of Society, and Its Relation to Modern Idea.</emphasis> First
147 edition. London: J. Murray.</para></footnote>. This is bad news for
148 those legal thinkers who do not understand it, which is why so much
149 pretending to understand now goes so floridly on. Potentially,
150 however, our great transition is very good news for those who can turn
151 this new-found land into property for themselves. Which is why the
152 current "owners" of software so strongly support and encourage the
153 ignorance of everyone else. Unfortunately for them - for reasons
154 familiar to legal theorists who haven't yet understood how to apply
155 their traditional logic in this area - the trick won't work. This
156 paper explains why<footnote><para>6. In general I dislike the
157 intrusion of autobiography into scholarship. But because it is here my
158 sad duty and great pleasure to challenge the qualifications or
159 <emphasis>bona fides</emphasis> of just about everyone, I must enable
160 the assessment of my own. I was first exposed to the craft of computer
161 programming in 1971. I began earning wages as a commercial programmer
162 in 1973 - at the age of thirteen - and did so, in a variety of
163 computer services, engineering, and multinational technology
164 enterprises, until 1985. In 1975 I helped write one of the first
165 networked e-mail systems in the United States; from 1979 I was engaged
166 in research and development of advanced computer programming languages
167 at IBM. These activities made it economically possible for me to study
168 the arts of historical scholarship and legal cunning. My wages were
169 sufficient to pay my tuitions, but not - to anticipate an argument
170 that will be made by the econodwarves further along - because my
171 programs were the intellectual property of my employer, but rather
172 because they made the hardware my employer sold work better. Most of
173 what I wrote was effectively free software, as we shall see. Although
174 I subsequently made some inconsiderable technical contributions to the
175 actual free software movement this paper describes, my primary
176 activities on its behalf have been legal: I have served for the past
177 five years (without pay, naturally) as general counsel of the Free
178 Software Foundation.</para></footnote>.</para>
179
180 <para>We need to begin by considering the technical essence of the
181 familiar devices that surround us in the era of "cultural software." A
182 CD player is a good example. Its primary input is a bitstream read
183 from an optical storage disk. The bitstream describes music in terms
184 of measurements, taken 44,000 times per second, of frequency and
185 amplitude in each of two audio channels. The player's primary output
186 is analog audio signals <footnote><para>7. The player, of course, has
187 secondary inputs and outputs in control channels: buttons or infrared
188 remote control are input, and time and track display are
189 output.</para></footnote>. Like everything else in the digital world,
190 music as seen by a CD player is mere numeric information; a particular
191 recording of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony recorded by Arturo Toscanini
192 and the NBC Symphony Orchestra and Chorale is (to drop a few
193 insignificant digits) 1276749873424, while Glenn Gould's peculiarly
194 perverse last recording of the Goldberg Variations is (similarly
195 rather truncated) 767459083268.</para>
196
197 <para>Oddly enough, these two numbers are "copyrighted." This means,
198 supposedly, that you can't possess another copy of these numbers, once
199 fixed in any physical form, unless you have licensed them. And you
200 can't turn 767459083268 into 2347895697 for your friends (thus
201 correcting Gould's ridiculous judgment about tempi) without making a
202 "derivative work," for which a license is necessary.</para>
203
204 <para>At the same time, a similar optical storage disk contains
205 another number, let us call it 7537489532. This one is an algorithm
206 for linear programming of large systems with multiple constraints,
207 useful for example if you want to make optimal use of your rolling
208 stock in running a freight railroad. This number (in the U.S.) is
209 "patented," which means you cannot derive 7537489532 for yourself, or
210 otherwise "practice the art" of the patent with respect to solving
211 linear programming problems no matter how you came by the idea,
212 including finding it out for yourself, unless you have a license from
213 the number's owner.</para>
214
215 <para>Then there's 9892454959483. This one is the source code for
216 Microsoft Word. In addition to being "copyrighted," this one is a
217 trade secret. That means if you take this number from Microsoft and
218 give it to anyone else you can be punished.</para>
219
220 <para>Lastly, there's 588832161316. It doesn't do anything, it's just
221 the square of 767354. As far as I know, it isn't owned by anybody
222 under any of these rubrics. Yet.</para>
223
224 <para>At this point we must deal with our first objection from the
225 learned. It comes from a creature known as the IPdroid. The droid has
226 a sophisticated mind and a cultured life. It appreciates very much the
227 elegant dinners at academic and ministerial conferences about the
228 TRIPs, not to mention the privilege of frequent appearances on MSNBC.
229 It wants you to know that I'm committing the mistake of confusing the
230 embodiment with the intellectual property itself. It's not the number
231 that's patented, stupid, just the Kamarkar algorithm. The number
232 <emphasis>can</emphasis> be copyrighted, because copyright covers the
233 expressive qualities of a particular tangible embodiment of an idea
234 (in which some functional properties may be mysteriously merged,
235 provided that they're not too merged), but not the algorithm. Whereas
236 the number isn't patentable, just the "teaching" of the number with
237 respect to making railroads run on time. And the number representing
238 the source code of Microsoft Word can be a trade secret, but if you
239 find it out for yourself (by performing arithmetic manipulation of
240 other numbers issued by Microsoft, for example, which is known as
241 "reverse engineering"), you're not going to be punished, at least if
242 you live in some parts of the United States.</para>
243
244 <para>This droid, like other droids, is often right. The condition of
245 being a droid is to know everything about something and nothing about
246 anything else. By its timely and urgent intervention the droid has
247 established that the current intellectual property system contains
248 many intricate and ingenious features. The complexities combine to
249 allow professors to be erudite, Congressmen to get campaign
250 contributions, lawyers to wear nice suits and tassel loafers, and
251 Murdoch to be rich. The complexities mostly evolved in an age of
252 industrial information distribution, when information was inscribed in
253 analog forms on physical objects that cost something significant to
254 make, move, and sell. When applied to digital information that moves
255 frictionlessly through the network and has zero marginal cost per
256 copy, everything still works, mostly, as long as you don't stop
257 squinting.</para>
258
259 <para>But that wasn't what I was arguing about. I wanted to point out
260 something else: that our world consists increasingly of nothing but
261 large numbers (also known as bitstreams), and that - for reasons
262 having nothing to do with emergent properties of the numbers
263 themselves - the legal system is presently committed to treating
264 similar numbers radically differently. No one can tell, simply by
265 looking at a number that is 100 million digits long, whether that
266 number is subject to patent, copyright, or trade secret protection, or
267 indeed whether it is "owned" by anyone at all. So the legal system we
268 have - blessed as we are by its consequences if we are copyright
269 teachers, Congressmen, Gucci-gulchers or Big Rupert himself - is
270 compelled to treat indistinguishable things in unlike ways.</para>
271
272 <para>Now, in my role as a legal historian concerned with the secular
273 (that is, very long term) development of legal thought, I claim that
274 legal regimes based on sharp but unpredictable distinctions among
275 similar objects are radically unstable. They fall apart over time
276 because every instance of the rules' application is an invitation to
277 at least one side to claim that instead of fitting in ideal category A
278 the particular object in dispute should be deemed to fit instead in
279 category B, where the rules will be more favorable to the party making
280 the claim. This game - about whether a typewriter should be deemed a
281 musical instrument for purposes of railway rate regulation, or whether
282 a steam shovel is a motor vehicle - is the frequent stuff of legal
283 ingenuity. But when the conventionally-approved legal categories
284 require judges to distinguish among the identical, the game is
285 infinitely lengthy, infinitely costly, and almost infinitely offensive
286 to the unbiased bystander <footnote><para>8. This is not an insight
287 unique to our present enterprise. A closely-related idea forms one of
288 the most important principles in the history of Anglo-American law,
289 perfectly put by Toby Milsom in the following terms:</para>
290 <blockquote><para>The life of the common law has been in the abuse of
291 its elementary ideas. If the rules of property give what now seems an
292 unjust answer, try obligation; and equity has proved that from the
293 materials of obligation you can counterfeit the phenomena of
294 property. If the rules of contract give what now seems an unjust
295 answer, try tort. ... If the rules of one tort, say deceit, give what
296 now seems an unjust answer, try another, try negligence. And so the
297 legal world goes round.</para></blockquote><para>S.F.C. Milsom,
298 1981. <emphasis>Historical Foundations of the Common Law.</emphasis>
299 Second edition. London: Butterworths, p. 6.</para> </footnote>.</para>
300
301 <para>Thus parties can spend all the money they want on all the
302 legislators and judges they can afford - which for the new "owners" of
303 the digital world is quite a few - but the rules they buy aren't going
304 to work in the end. Sooner or later, the paradigms are going to
305 collapse. Of course, if later means two generations from now, the
306 distribution of wealth and power sanctified in the meantime may not be
307 reversible by any course less drastic than a <emphasis>bellum
308 servile</emphasis> of couch potatoes against media magnates. So
309 knowing that history isn't on Bill Gates' side isn't enough. We are
310 predicting the future in a very limited sense: we know that the
311 existing rules, which have yet the fervor of conventional belief
312 solidly enlisted behind them, are no longer meaningful. Parties will
313 use and abuse them freely until the mainstream of "respectable"
314 conservative opinion acknowledges their death, with uncertain
315 results. But realistic scholarship should already be turning its
316 attention to the clear need for new thoughtways.</para>
317
318 <para>When we reach this point in the argument, we find ourselves
319 contending with the other primary protagonist of educated idiocy: the
320 econodwarf. Like the IPdroid, the econodwarf is a species of hedgehog,
321 <footnote><para>9. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Isaiah Berlin,
322 1953. <emphasis>The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View
323 of History.</emphasis> New York: Simon and Schuster.</para>
324 </footnote> but where the droid is committed to logic over experience,
325 the econodwarf specializes in an energetic and well-focused but
326 entirely erroneous view of human nature. According to the econodwarf's
327 vision, each human being is an individual possessing "incentives,"
328 which can be retrospectively unearthed by imagining the state of the
329 bank account at various times. So in this instance the econodwarf
330 feels compelled to object that without the rules I am lampooning,
331 there would be no incentive to create the things the rules treat as
332 property: without the ability to exclude others from music there would
333 be no music, because no one could be sure of getting paid for creating
334 it.</para>
335
336 <para>Music is not really our subject; the software I am considering
337 at the moment is the old kind: computer programs. But as he is
338 determined to deal at least cursorily with the subject, and because,
339 as we have seen, it is no longer really possible to distinguish
340 computer programs from music performances, a word or two should be
341 said. At least we can have the satisfaction of indulging in an
342 argument <emphasis>ad pygmeam</emphasis>. When the econodwarf grows
343 rich, in my experience, he attends the opera. But no matter how often
344 he hears <emphasis>Don Giovanni</emphasis> it never occurs to him that
345 Mozart's fate should, on his logic, have entirely discouraged
346 Beethoven, or that we have <emphasis>The Magic Flute</emphasis> even
347 though Mozart knew very well he wouldn't be paid. In fact,
348 <emphasis>The Magic Flute</emphasis>, <emphasis>St. Matthew's
349 Passion</emphasis>, and the motets of the wife-murderer Carlo Gesualdo
350 are all part of the centuries-long tradition of free software, in the
351 more general sense, which the econodwarf never quite
352 acknowledges.</para> <!--<center><img
353 src="anarchism_files/mog1.gif"></center> --> <para> The dwarf's basic
354 problem is that "incentives" is merely a metaphor, and as a metaphor
355 to describe human creative activity it's pretty crummy. I have said
356 this before, <footnote> <para>10. <emphasis>See</emphasis> <ulink
357 url="http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/nospeech.html">The
358 Virtual Scholar and Network Liberation.</ulink></para> </footnote> but
359 the better metaphor arose on the day Michael Faraday first noticed
360 what happened when he wrapped a coil of wire around a magnet and spun
361 the magnet. Current flows in such a wire, but we don't ask what the
362 incentive is for the electrons to leave home. We say that the current
363 results from an emergent property of the system, which we call
364 induction. The question we ask is "what's the resistance of the wire?"
365 So Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to Faraday's Law says that if you
366 wrap the Internet around every person on the planet and spin the
367 planet, software flows in the network. It's an emergent property of
368 connected human minds that they create things for one another's
369 pleasure and to conquer their uneasy sense of being too alone. The
370 only question to ask is, what's the resistance of the network?
371 Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to Ohm's Law states that the
372 resistance of the network is directly proportional to the field
373 strength of the "intellectual property" system. So the right answer to
374 the econodwarf is, resist the resistance.</para>
375
376 <para>Of course, this is all very well in theory. "Resist the
377 resistance" sounds good, but we'd have a serious problem, theory
378 notwithstanding, if the dwarf were right and we found ourselves
379 under-producing good software because we didn't let people own it. But
380 dwarves and droids are formalists of different kinds, and the
381 advantage of realism is that if you start from the facts the facts are
382 always on your side. It turns out that treating software as property
383 makes bad software.</para>
384
385 </section>
386 <section>
387 <title>II. Software as Property: The Practical Problem</title>
388
389 <para>In order to understand why turning software into property
390 produces bad software, we need an introduction to the history of the
391 art. In fact, we'd better start with the word "art" itself. The
392 programming of computers combines determinate reasoning with literary
393 invention.</para>
394
395 <para>At first glance, to be sure, source code appears to be a
396 non-literary form of composition <footnote><para>11. Some basic
397 vocabulary is essential. Digital computers actually execute numerical
398 instructions: bitstrings that contain information in the "native"
399 language created by the machine's designers. This is usually referred
400 to as "machine language." The machine languages of hardware are
401 designed for speed of execution at the hardware level, and are not
402 suitable for direct use by human beings. So among the central
403 components of a computer system are "programming languages," which
404 translate expressions convenient for humans into machine language. The
405 most common and relevant, but by no means the only, form of computer
406 language is a "compiler." The compiler performs static translation, so
407 that a file containing human-readable instructions, known as "source
408 code" results in the generation of one or more files of executable
409 machine language, known as "object code."</para> </footnote>. The
410 primary desideratum in a computer program is that it works, that is to
411 say, performs according to specifications formally describing its
412 outputs in terms of its inputs. At this level of generality, the
413 functional content of programs is all that can be seen.</para>
414
415 <para>But working computer programs exist as parts of computer
416 systems, which are interacting collections of hardware, software, and
417 human beings. The human components of a computer system include not
418 only the users, but also the (potentially different) persons who
419 maintain and improve the system. Source code not only communicates
420 with the computer that executes the program, through the intermediary
421 of the compiler that produces machine-language object code, but also
422 with other programmers.</para>
423
424 <para>The function of source code in relation to other human beings is
425 not widely grasped by non-programmers, who tend to think of computer
426 programs as incomprehensible. They would be surprised to learn that
427 the bulk of information contained in most programs is, from the point
428 of view of the compiler or other language processor, "comment," that
429 is, non-functional material. The comments, of course, are addressed to
430 others who may need to fix a problem or to alter or enhance the
431 program's operation. In most programming languages, far more space is
432 spent in telling people what the program does than in telling the
433 computer how to do it.</para>
434
435 <para>The design of programming languages has always proceeded under
436 the dual requirements of complete specification for machine execution
437 and informative description for human readers. One might identify
438 three basic strategies in language design for approaching this dual
439 purpose. The first, pursued initially with respect to the design of
440 languages specific to particular hardware products and collectively
441 known as "assemblers," essentially separated the human- and
442 machine-communication portions of the program. Assembler instructions
443 are very close relatives of machine-language instructions: in general,
444 one line of an assembler program corresponds to one instruction in the
445 native language of the machine. The programmer controls machine
446 operation at the most specific possible level, and (if
447 well-disciplined) engages in running commentary alongside the machine
448 instructions, pausing every few hundred instructions to create "block
449 comments," which provide a summary of the strategy of the program, or
450 document the major data structures the program manipulates.</para>
451
452 <para>A second approach, characteristically depicted by the language
453 COBOL (which stood for "Common Business-Oriented Language"), was to
454 make the program itself look like a set of natural language
455 directions, written in a crabbed but theoretically human-readable
456 style. A line of COBOL code might say, for example "MULTIPLY PRICE
457 TIMES QUANTITY GIVING EXPANSION." At first, when the Pentagon and
458 industry experts began the joint design of COBOL in the early 1960's,
459 this seemed a promising approach. COBOL programs appeared largely
460 self-documenting, allowing both the development of work teams able to
461 collaborate on the creation of large programs, and the training of
462 programmers who, while specialized workers, would not need to
463 understand the machine as intimately as assembler programs had to. But
464 the level of generality at which such programs documented themselves
465 was wrongly selected. A more formulaic and compressed expression of
466 operational detail "expansion = price x quantity," for example, was
467 better suited even to business and financial applications where the
468 readers and writers of programs were accustomed to mathematical
469 expression, while the processes of describing both data structures and
470 the larger operational context of the program were not rendered
471 unnecessary by the wordiness of the language in which the details of
472 execution were specified.</para>
473
474 <para>Accordingly, language designers by the late 1960s began
475 experimenting with forms of expression in which the blending of
476 operational details and non-functional information necessary for
477 modification or repair was more subtle. Some designers chose the path
478 of highly symbolic and compressed languages, in which the programmer
479 manipulated data abstractly, so that "A x B" might mean the
480 multiplication of two integers, two complex numbers, two vast arrays,
481 or any other data type capable of some process called
482 "multiplication," to be undertaken by the computer on the basis of the
483 context for the variables "A" and "B" at the moment of execution
484 <footnote> <para>12. This, I should say, was the path that most of my
485 research and development followed, largely in connection with a
486 language called APL ("A Programming Language") and its successors. It
487 was not, however, the ultimately-dominant approach, for reasons that
488 will be suggested below.</para> </footnote> . Because this approach
489 resulted in extremely concise programs, it was thought, the problem of
490 making code comprehensible to those who would later seek to modify or
491 repair it was simplified. By hiding the technical detail of computer
492 operation and emphasizing the algorithm, languages could be devised
493 that were better than English or other natural languages for the
494 expression of stepwise processes. Commentary would be not only
495 unnecessary but distracting, just as the metaphors used to convey
496 mathematical concepts in English do more to confuse than to
497 enlighten.</para>
498
499 <section>
500 <title>How We Created the Microbrain Mess</title>
501
502 <para>Thus the history of programming languages directly reflected the
503 need to find forms of human-machine communication that were also
504 effective in conveying complex ideas to human readers. "Expressivity"
505 became a property of programming languages, not because it facilitated
506 computation, but because it facilitated the collaborative creation and
507 maintenance of increasingly complex software systems.</para>
508
509 <para>At first impression, this seems to justify the application of
510 traditional copyright thinking to the resulting works. Though
511 substantially involving "functional" elements, computer programs
512 contained "expressive" features of paramount importance. Copyright
513 doctrine recognized the merger of function and expression as
514 characteristic of many kinds of copyrighted works. "Source code,"
515 containing both the machine instructions necessary for functional
516 operation and the expressive "commentary" intended for human readers,
517 was an appropriate candidate for copyright treatment.</para>
518
519 <para>True, so long as it is understood that the expressive component
520 of software was present solely in order to facilitate the making of
521 "derivative works." Were it not for the intention to facilitate
522 alteration, the expressive elements of programs would be entirely
523 supererogatory, and source code would be no more copyrightable than
524 object code, the output of the language processor, purged of all but
525 the program's functional characteristics.</para>
526
527 <para>The state of the computer industry throughout the 1960's and
528 1970's, when the grundnorms of sophisticated computer programming were
529 established, concealed the tension implicit in this situation. In that
530 period, hardware was expensive. Computers were increasingly large and
531 complex collections of machines, and the business of designing and
532 building such an array of machines for general use was dominated, not
533 to say monopolized, by one firm. IBM gave away its software. To be
534 sure, it owned the programs its employees wrote, and it copyrighted
535 the source code. But it also distributed the programs - including the
536 source code - to its customers at no additional charge, and encouraged
537 them to make and share improvements or adaptations of the programs
538 thus distributed. For a dominant hardware manufacturer, this strategy
539 made sense: better programs sold more computers, which is where the
540 profitability of the business rested.</para>
541
542 <para>Computers, in this period, tended to aggregate within particular
543 organizations, but not to communicate broadly with one another. The
544 software needed to operate was distributed not through a network, but
545 on spools of magnetic tape. This distribution system tended to
546 centralize software development, so that while IBM customers were free
547 to make modifications and improvements to programs, those
548 modifications were shared in the first instance with IBM, which then
549 considered whether and in what way to incorporate those changes in the
550 centrally-developed and distributed version of the software. Thus in
551 two important senses the best computer software in the world was free:
552 it cost nothing to acquire, and the terms on which it was furnished
553 both allowed and encouraged experimentation, change, and improvement
554 <footnote><para>13. This description elides some details. By the
555 mid-1970's IBM had acquired meaningful competition in the mainframe
556 computer business, while the large-scale antitrust action brought
557 against it by the U.S. government prompted the decision to "unbundle,"
558 or charge separately, for software. In this less important sense,
559 software ceased to be free. But - without entering into the now-dead
560 but once-heated controversy over IBM's software pricing policies - the
561 unbundling revolution had less effect on the social practices of
562 software manufacture than might be supposed. As a fellow responsible
563 for technical improvement of one programming language product at IBM
564 from 1979 to 1984, for example, I was able to treat the product as
565 "almost free," that is, to discuss with users the changes they had
566 proposed or made in the programs, and to engage with them in
567 cooperative development of the product for the benefit of all
568 users.</para> </footnote>. That the software in question was IBM's
569 property under prevailing copyright law certainly established some
570 theoretical limits on users' ability to distribute their improvements
571 or adaptations to others, but in practice mainframe software was
572 cooperatively developed by the dominant hardware manufacturer and its
573 technically-sophisticated users, employing the manufacturer's
574 distribution resources to propagate the resulting improvements through
575 the user community. The right to exclude others, one of the most
576 important "sticks in the bundle" of property rights (in an image
577 beloved of the United States Supreme Court), was practically
578 unimportant, or even undesirable, at the heart of the software
579 business <footnote> <para>14. This description is highly compressed,
580 and will seem both overly simplified and unduly rosy to those who also
581 worked in the industry during this period of its
582 development. Copyright protection of computer software was a
583 controversial subject in the 1970's, leading to the famous CONTU
584 commission and its mildly pro-copyright recommendations of 1979. And
585 IBM seemed far less cooperative to its users at the time than this
586 sketch makes out. But the most important element is the contrast with
587 the world created by the PC, the Internet, and the dominance of
588 Microsoft, with the resulting impetus for the free software movement,
589 and I am here concentrating on the features that express that
590 contrast.</para></footnote>.</para>
591
592 <para>After 1980, everything was different. The world of mainframe
593 hardware gave way within ten years to the world of the commodity PC.
594 And, as a contingency of the industry's development, the single most
595 important element of the software running on that commodity PC, the
596 operating system, became the sole significant product of a company
597 that made no hardware. High-quality basic software ceased to be part
598 of the product-differentiation strategy of hardware
599 manufacturers. Instead, a firm with an overwhelming share of the
600 market, and with the near-monopolist's ordinary absence of interest in
601 fostering diversity, set the practices of the software industry. In
602 such a context, the right to exclude others from participation in the
603 product's formation became profoundly important. Microsoft's power in
604 the market rested entirely on its ownership of the Windows source
605 code.</para>
606
607 <para>To Microsoft, others' making of "derivative works," otherwise
608 known as repairs and improvements, threatened the central asset of the
609 business. Indeed, as subsequent judicial proceedings have tended to
610 establish, Microsoft's strategy as a business was to find innovative
611 ideas elsewhere in the software marketplace, buy them up and either
612 suppress them or incorporate them in its proprietary product. The
613 maintenance of control over the basic operation of computers
614 manufactured, sold, possessed, and used by others represented profound
615 and profitable leverage over the development of the culture <footnote>
616 <para>15. I discuss the importance of PC software in this context, the
617 evolution of "the market for eyeballs" and "the sponsored life" in
618 other chapters of my forthcoming book, <emphasis>The Invisible
619 Barbecue</emphasis>, of which this essay forms a part.</para>
620 </footnote>.; the right to exclude returned to center stage in the
621 concept of software as property.</para>
622
623 <para>The result, so far as the quality of software was concerned, was
624 disastrous. The monopoly was a wealthy and powerful corporation that
625 employed a large number of programmers, but it could not possibly
626 afford the number of testers, designers, and developers required to
627 produce flexible, robust and technically-innovative software
628 appropriate to the vast array of conditions under which increasingly
629 ubiquitous personal computers operated. Its fundamental marketing
630 strategy involved designing its product for the least
631 technically-sophisticated users, and using "fear, uncertainty, and
632 doubt" (known within Microsoft as "FUD") to drive sophisticated users
633 away from potential competitors, whose long-term survivability in the
634 face of Microsoft's market power was always in question.</para>
635
636 <para>Without the constant interaction between users able to repair
637 and improve and the operating system's manufacturer, the inevitable
638 deterioration of quality could not be arrested. But because the
639 personal computer revolution expanded the number of users
640 exponentially, almost everyone who came in contact with the resulting
641 systems had nothing against which to compare them. Unaware of the
642 standards of stability, reliability, maintainability and effectiveness
643 that had previously been established in the mainframe world, users of
644 personal computers could hardly be expected to understand how badly,
645 in relative terms, the monopoly's software functioned. As the power
646 and capacity of personal computers expanded rapidly, the defects of
647 the software were rendered less obvious amidst the general increase of
648 productivity. Ordinary users, more than half afraid of the technology
649 they almost completely did not understand, actually welcomed the
650 defectiveness of the software. In an economy undergoing mysterious
651 transformations, with the concomitant destabilization of millions of
652 careers, it was tranquilizing, in a perverse way, that no personal
653 computer seemed to be able to run for more than a few consecutive
654 hours without crashing. Although it was frustrating to lose work in
655 progress each time an unnecessary failure occurred, the evident
656 fallibility of computers was intrinsically reassuring <footnote>
657 <para>16. This same pattern of ambivalence, in which bad programming
658 leading to widespread instability in the new technology is
659 simultaneously frightening and reassuring to technical incompetents,
660 can be seen also in the primarily-American phenomenon of Y2K
661 hysteria.</para> </footnote> .</para>
662
663 <para>None of this was necessary. The low quality of personal computer
664 software could have been reversed by including users directly in the
665 inherently evolutionary process of software design and implementation.
666 A Lamarckian mode, in which improvements could be made anywhere, by
667 anyone, and inherited by everyone else, would have wiped out the
668 deficit, restoring to the world of the PC the stability and
669 reliability of the software made in the quasi-propertarian environment
670 of the mainframe era. But the Microsoft business model precluded
671 Lamarckian inheritance of software improvements. Copyright doctrine,
672 in general and as it applies to software in particular, biases the
673 world towards creationism; in this instance, the problem is that BillG
674 the Creator was far from infallible, and in fact he wasn't even
675 trying.</para> <!--<center><img src="anarchism_files/mog2.gif"
676 hspace="0" vspace="0"></center>--> <para>To make the irony more
677 severe, the growth of the network rendered the non-propertarian
678 alternative even more practical. What scholarly and popular writing
679 alike denominate as a thing ("the Internet") is actually the name of a
680 social condition: the fact that everyone in the network society is
681 connected directly, without intermediation, to everyone else
682 <footnote> <para>17. The critical implications of this simple
683 observation about our metaphors are worked out in "How Not to Think
684 about 'The Internet'," in <emphasis>The Invisible Barbecue</emphasis>,
685 forthcoming.</para> </footnote>. The global interconnection of
686 networks eliminated the bottleneck that had required a centralized
687 software manufacturer to rationalize and distribute the outcome of
688 individual innovation in the era of the mainframe.</para>
689
690 <para>And so, in one of history's little ironies, the global triumph
691 of bad software in the age of the PC was reversed by a surprising
692 combination of forces: the social transformation initiated by the
693 network, a long-discarded European theory of political economy, and a
694 small band of programmers throughout the world mobilized by a single
695 simple idea.</para>
696
697 </section>
698 <section>
699
700 <title>Software Wants to Be Free; or, How We Stopped Worrying and
701 Learned to Love the Bomb</title>
702
703 <para>Long before the network of networks was a practical reality,
704 even before it was an aspiration, there was a desire for computers to
705 operate on the basis of software freely available to everyone. This
706 began as a reaction against propertarian software in the mainframe
707 era, and requires another brief historical digression.</para>
708
709 <para>Even though IBM was the largest seller of general purpose
710 computers in the mainframe era, it was not the largest designer and
711 builder of such hardware. The telephone monopoly, American Telephone
712 &amp; Telegraph, was in fact larger than IBM, but it consumed its
713 products internally. And at the famous Bell Labs research arm of the
714 telephone monopoly, in the late 1960's, the developments in computer
715 languages previously described gave birth to an operating system
716 called Unix.</para>
717
718 <para>The idea of Unix was to create a single, scalable operating
719 system to exist on all the computers, from small to large, that the
720 telephone monopoly made for itself. To achieve this goal meant writing
721 an operating system not in machine language, nor in an assembler whose
722 linguistic form was integral to a particular hardware design, but in a
723 more expressive and generalized language. The one chosen was also a
724 Bell Labs invention, called "C" <footnote> <para>18. Technical readers
725 will again observe that this compresses developments occurring from
726 1969 through 1973.</para> </footnote>. The C language became common,
727 even dominant, for many kinds of programming tasks, and by the late
728 1970's the Unix operating system written in that language had been
729 transferred (or "ported," in professional jargon) to computers made by
730 many manufacturers and of many designs.</para>
731
732 <para>AT&amp;T distributed Unix widely, and because of the very design
733 of the operating system, it had to make that distribution in C source
734 code. But AT&amp;T retained ownership of the source code and
735 compelled users to purchase licenses that prohibited redistribution
736 and the making of derivative works. Large computing centers, whether
737 industrial or academic, could afford to purchase such licenses, but
738 individuals could not, while the license restrictions prevented the
739 community of programmers who used Unix from improving it in an
740 evolutionary rather than episodic fashion. And as programmers
741 throughout the world began to aspire to and even expect a personal
742 computer revolution, the "unfree" status of Unix became a source of
743 concern.</para>
744
745 <para>Between 1981 and 1984, one man envisioned a crusade to change
746 the situation. Richard M. Stallman, then an employee of MIT's
747 Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, conceived the project of
748 independent, collaborative redesign and implementation of an operating
749 system that would be true free software. In Stallman's phrase, free
750 software would be a matter of freedom, not of price. Anyone could
751 freely modify and redistribute such software, or sell it, subject only
752 to the restriction that he not try to reduce the rights of others to
753 whom he passed it along. In this way free software could become a
754 self-organizing project, in which no innovation would be lost through
755 proprietary exercises of rights. The system, Stallman decided, would
756 be called GNU, which stood (in an initial example of a taste for
757 recursive acronyms that has characterized free software ever since),
758 for "GNU's Not Unix." Despite misgivings about the fundamental design
759 of Unix, as well as its terms of distribution, GNU was intended to
760 benefit from the wide if unfree source distribution of Unix. Stallman
761 began Project GNU by writing components of the eventual system that
762 were also designed to work without modification on existing Unix
763 systems. Development of the GNU tools could thus proceed directly in
764 the environment of university and other advanced computing centers
765 around the world.</para>
766
767 <para>The scale of such a project was immense. Somehow, volunteer
768 programmers had to be found, organized, and set to work building all
769 the tools that would be necessary for the ultimate construction.
770 Stallman himself was the primary author of several fundamental tools.
771 Others were contributed by small or large teams of programmers
772 elsewhere, and assigned to Stallman's project or distributed
773 directly. A few locations around the developing network became
774 archives for the source code of these GNU components, and throughout
775 the 1980's the GNU tools gained recognition and acceptance by Unix
776 users throughout the world. The stability, reliability, and
777 maintainability of the GNU tools became a by-word, while Stallman's
778 profound abilities as a designer continued to outpace, and provide
779 goals for, the evolving process. The award to Stallman of a MacArthur
780 Fellowship in 1990 was an appropriate recognition of his conceptual
781 and technical innovations and their social consequences.</para>
782
783 <para>Project GNU, and the Free Software Foundation to which it gave
784 birth in 1985, were not the only source of free software
785 ideas. Several forms of copyright license designed to foster free or
786 partially free software began to develop in the academic community,
787 mostly around the Unix environment. The University of California at
788 Berkeley began the design and implementation of another version of
789 Unix for free distribution in the academic community. BSD Unix, as it
790 came to be known, also treated AT&amp;T's Unix as a design
791 standard. The code was broadly released and constituted a reservoir of
792 tools and techniques, but its license terms limited the range of its
793 application, while the elimination of hardware-specific proprietary
794 code from the distribution meant that no one could actually build a
795 working operating system for any particular computer from BSD. Other
796 university-based work also eventuated in quasi-free software; the
797 graphical user interface (or GUI) for Unix systems called X Windows,
798 for example, was created at MIT and distributed with source code on
799 terms permitting free modification. And in 1989-1990, an undergraduate
800 computer science student at the University of Helsinki, Linus
801 Torvalds, began the project that completed the circuit and fully
802 energized the free software vision.</para>
803
804 <para>What Torvalds did was to begin adapting a computer science
805 teaching tool for real life use. Andrew Tannenbaum's MINIX kernel
806 <footnote> <para>19. Operating systems, even Windows (which hides the
807 fact from its users as thoroughly as possible), are actually
808 collections of components, rather than undivided unities. Most of what
809 an operating system does (manage file systems, control process
810 execution, etc.) can be abstracted from the actual details of the
811 computer hardware on which the operating system runs. Only a small
812 inner core of the system must actually deal with the eccentric
813 peculiarities of particular hardware. Once the operating system is
814 written in a general language such as C, only that inner core, known
815 in the trade as the kernel, will be highly specific to a particular
816 computer architecture.</para> </footnote> , was a staple of Operating
817 Systems courses, providing an example of basic solutions to basic
818 problems. Slowly, and at first without recognizing the intention,
819 Linus began turning the MINIX kernel into an actual kernel for Unix on
820 the Intel x86 processors, the engines that run the world's commodity
821 PCs. As Linus began developing this kernel, which he named Linux, he
822 realized that the best way to make his project work would be to adjust
823 his design decisions so that the existing GNU components would be
824 compatible with his kernel.</para>
825
826 <para>The result of Torvalds' work was the release on the net in 1991
827 of a sketchy working model of a free software kernel for a Unix-like
828 operating system for PCs, fully compatible with and designed
829 convergently with the large and high-quality suite of system
830 components created by Stallman's Project GNU and distributed by the
831 Free Software Foundation. Because Torvalds chose to release the Linux
832 kernel under the Free Software Foundation's General Public License, of
833 which more below, the hundreds and eventually thousands of programmers
834 around the world who chose to contribute their effort towards the
835 further development of the kernel could be sure that their efforts
836 would result in permanently free software that no one could turn into
837 a proprietary product. Everyone knew that everyone else would be able
838 to test, improve, and redistribute their improvements. Torvalds
839 accepted contributions freely, and with a genially effective style
840 maintained overall direction without dampening enthusiasm. The
841 development of the Linux kernel proved that the Internet made it
842 possible to aggregate collections of programmers far larger than any
843 commercial manufacturer could afford, joined almost non-hierarchically
844 in a development project ultimately involving more than one million
845 lines of computer code - a scale of collaboration among geographically
846 dispersed unpaid volunteers previously unimaginable in human history
847 <footnote> <para>20. A careful and creative analysis of how Torvalds
848 made this process work, and what it implies for the social practices
849 of creating software, was provided by Eric S. Raymond in his seminal
850 1997 paper, <ulink
851 url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue3_3/raymond/index.html">The
852 Cathedral and the Bazaar,</ulink> which itself played a significant
853 role in the expansion of the free software idea.</para>
854 </footnote>.</para>
855
856 <para>By 1994, Linux had reached version 1.0, representing a usable
857 production kernel. Level 2.0 was reached in 1996, and by 1998, with
858 the kernel at 2.2.0 and available not only for x86 machines but for a
859 variety of other machine architectures, GNU/Linux - the combination of
860 the Linux kernel and the much larger body of Project GNU components -
861 and Windows NT were the only two operating systems in the world
862 gaining market share. A Microsoft internal assessment of the situation
863 leaked in October 1998 and subsequently acknowledged by the company as
864 genuine concluded that "Linux represents a best-of-breed UNIX, that is
865 trusted in mission critical applications, and - due to it's [sic] open
866 source code - has a long term credibility which exceeds many other
867 competitive OS's." <footnote> <para>21. This is a quotation from what
868 is known in the trade as the "Halloween memo," which can be found, as
869 annotated by Eric Raymond, to whom it was leaked, at <ulink
870 url="http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween1.html">
871 http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween1.html</ulink>.</para></footnote>
872 GNU/Linux systems are now used throughout the world, operating
873 everything from Web servers at major electronic commerce sites to
874 "ad-hoc supercomputer" clusters to the network infrastructure of
875 money-center banks. GNU/Linux is found on the space shuttle, and
876 running behind-the-scenes computers at (yes) Microsoft. Industry
877 evaluations of the comparative reliability of Unix systems have
878 repeatedly shown that Linux is far and away the most stable and
879 reliable Unix kernel, with a reliability exceeded only by the GNU
880 tools themselves. GNU/Linux not only out-performs commercial
881 proprietary Unix versions for PCs in benchmarks, but is renowned for
882 its ability to run, undisturbed and uncomplaining, for months on end
883 in high-volume high-stress environments without crashing.</para>
884
885 <para>Other components of the free software movement have been equally
886 successful. Apache, far and away the world's leading Web server
887 program, is free software, as is Perl, the programming language which
888 is the lingua franca for the programmers who build sophisticated Web
889 sites. Netscape Communications now distributes its Netscape
890 Communicator 5.0 browser as free software, under a close variant of
891 the Free Software Foundation's General Public License. Major PC
892 manufacturers, including IBM, have announced plans or are already
893 distributing GNU/Linux as a customer option on their top-of-the-line
894 PCs intended for use as Web- and file servers. Samba, a program that
895 allows GNU/Linux computers to act as Windows NT file servers, is used
896 worldwide as an alternative to Windows NT Server, and provides
897 effective low-end competition to Microsoft in its own home market. By
898 the standards of software quality that have been recognized in the
899 industry for decades - and whose continuing relevance will be clear to
900 you the next time your Windows PC crashes - the news at century's end
901 is unambiguous. The world's most profitable and powerful corporation
902 comes in a distant second, having excluded all but the real victor
903 from the race. Propertarianism joined to capitalist vigor destroyed
904 meaningful commercial competition, but when it came to making good
905 software, anarchism won.</para>
906
907
908 </section>
909 </section>
910 <!--<para><img src="anarchism_files/quad.gif"></para><a name="m3"></a>-->
911 <section>
912 <title>III. Anarchism as a Mode of Production</title>
913
914 <para>It's a pretty story, and if only the IPdroid and the econodwarf
915 hadn't been blinded by theory, they'd have seen it coming. But though
916 some of us had been working for it and predicting it for years, the
917 theoretical consequences are so subversive for the thoughtways that
918 maintain our dwarves and droids in comfort that they can hardly be
919 blamed for refusing to see. The facts proved that something was wrong
920 with the "incentives" metaphor that underprops conventional
921 intellectual property reasoning <footnote> <para>22. As recently as
922 early 1994 a talented and technically competent (though Windows-using)
923 law and economics scholar at a major U.S. law school confidently
924 informed me that free software couldn't possibly exist, because no one
925 would have any incentive to make really sophisticated programs
926 requiring substantial investment of effort only to give them
927 away.</para> </footnote> . But they did more. They provided an initial
928 glimpse into the future of human creativity in a world of global
929 interconnection, and it's not a world made for dwarves and
930 droids.</para>
931
932 <para>My argument, before we paused for refreshment in the real world,
933 can be summarized this way: Software - whether executable programs,
934 music, visual art, liturgy, weaponry, or what have you - consists of
935 bitstreams, which although essentially indistinguishable are treated
936 by a confusing multiplicity of legal categories. This multiplicity is
937 unstable in the long term for reasons integral to the legal process.
938 The unstable diversity of rules is caused by the need to distinguish
939 among kinds of property interests in bitstreams. This need is
940 primarily felt by those who stand to profit from the socially
941 acceptable forms of monopoly created by treating ideas as
942 property. Those of us who are worried about the social inequity and
943 cultural hegemony created by this intellectually unsatisfying and
944 morally repugnant regime are shouted down. Those doing the shouting,
945 the dwarves and the droids, believe that these property rules are
946 necessary not from any overt yearning for life in Murdochworld -
947 though a little luxurious co-optation is always welcome - but because
948 the metaphor of incentives, which they take to be not just an image
949 but an argument, proves that these rules - despite their lamentable
950 consequences - are necessary if we are to make good software. The only
951 way to continue to believe this is to ignore the facts. At the center
952 of the digital revolution, with the executable bitstreams that make
953 everything else possible, propertarian regimes not only do not make
954 things better, they can make things radically worse. Property
955 concepts, whatever else may be wrong with them, do not enable and have
956 in fact retarded progress.</para>
957
958 <para>
959 But what is this mysterious alternative? Free software exists, but
960 what are its mechanisms, and how does it generalize towards a
961 non-propertarian theory of the digital society?</para>
962
963 </section>
964 <section>
965
966 <title>The Legal Theory of Free Software</title>
967
968 <para>There is a myth, like most myths partially founded on reality,
969 that computer programmers are all libertarians. Right-wing ones are
970 capitalists, cleave to their stock options, and disdain taxes, unions,
971 and civil rights laws; left-wing ones hate the market and all
972 government, believe in strong encryption no matter how much nuclear
973 terrorism it may cause, <footnote> <para>23. This question too
974 deserves special scrutiny, encrusted as it is with special pleading on
975 the state-power side. See my brief essay <ulink
976 url="http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/yu-encrypt.html">"<emphasis>So
977 Much for Savages</emphasis>: Navajo 1, Government 0 in Final Moments of
978 Play."</ulink></para> </footnote> and dislike Bill Gates because he's
979 rich. There is doubtless a foundation for this belief. But the most
980 significant difference between political thought inside the digirati
981 and outside it is that in the network society, anarchism (or more
982 properly, anti-possessive individualism) is a viable political
983 philosophy.</para>
984
985 <para>The center of the free software movement's success, and the
986 greatest achievement of Richard Stallman, is not a piece of computer
987 code. The success of free software, including the overwhelming success
988 of GNU/Linux, results from the ability to harness extraordinary
989 quantities of high-quality effort for projects of immense size and
990 profound complexity. And this ability in turn results from the legal
991 context in which the labor is mobilized. As a visionary designer
992 Richard Stallman created more than Emacs, GDB, or GNU. He created the
993 General Public License.</para>
994
995 <!-- <center><img src="anarchism_files/mog3.gif" hspace="0"
996 vspace="0"></center> --> <para>The GPL, <footnote>
997 <para>24. <emphasis>See</emphasis> <ulink
998 url="http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt">GNU General Public License,
999 Version 2, June 1991.</ulink></para> </footnote> also known as the
1000 copyleft, uses copyright, to paraphrase Toby Milsom, to counterfeit
1001 the phenomena of anarchism. As the license preamble expresses
1002 it:</para>
1003
1004 <blockquote><para>When we speak of free software, we are referring to
1005 freedom, not price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make
1006 sure that you have the freedom to distribute copies of free software
1007 (and charge for this service if you wish), that you receive source
1008 code or can get it if you want it, that you can change the software or
1009 use pieces of it in new free programs; and that you know you can do
1010 these things.</para>
1011
1012 <para>To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that
1013 forbid anyone to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender the
1014 rights. These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for
1015 you if you distribute copies of the software, or if you modify
1016 it.</para>
1017
1018 <para>For example, if you distribute copies of such a program,
1019 whether gratis or for a fee, you must give the recipients all the
1020 rights that you have. You must make sure that they, too, receive or
1021 can get the source code. And you must show them these terms so they
1022 know their rights.</para>
1023
1024 <para>Many variants of this basic free software idea have been
1025 expressed in licenses of various kinds, as I have already
1026 indicated. The GPL is different from the other ways of expressing
1027 these values in one crucial respect. Section 2 of the license provides
1028 in pertinent part:</para>
1029
1030 <para>You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or any
1031 portion of it, thus forming a work based on the Program, and copy and
1032 distribute such modifications or work ..., provided that you also meet
1033 all of these conditions: </para>
1034
1035 <para>...</para>
1036
1037 <para>b) You must cause any work that you distribute or publish,
1038 that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or
1039 any part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third
1040 parties under the terms of this License.</para></blockquote>
1041
1042 <para>Section 2(b) of the GPL is sometimes called "restrictive," but
1043 its intention is liberating. It creates a commons, to which anyone may
1044 add but from which no one may subtract. Because of §2(b), each
1045 contributor to a GPL'd project is assured that she, and all other
1046 users, will be able to run, modify and redistribute the program
1047 indefinitely, that source code will always be available, and that,
1048 unlike commercial software, its longevity cannot be limited by the
1049 contingencies of the marketplace or the decisions of future
1050 developers. This "inheritance" of the GPL has sometimes been
1051 criticized as an example of the free software movement's
1052 anti-commercial bias. Nothing could be further from the truth. The
1053 effect of §2(b) is to make commercial distributors of free software
1054 better competitors against proprietary software businesses. For
1055 confirmation of this point, one can do no better than to ask the
1056 proprietary competitors. As the author of the Microsoft "Halloween"
1057 memorandum, Vinod Vallopillil, put it:</para>
1058
1059 <blockquote><para>The GPL and its aversion to code forking reassures
1060 customers that they aren't riding an evolutionary `dead-end' by
1061 subscribing to a particular commercial version of Linux.</para>
1062
1063 <para>The "evolutionary dead-end" is the core of the software
1064 FUD argument <footnote> <para>25. <ulink
1065 url="http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween1.html">V. Vallopillil,
1066 Open Source Software: A (New?) Development Methodology.</ulink></para>
1067 </footnote> .</para></blockquote>
1068
1069 <para>Translated out of Microspeak, this means that the strategy by
1070 which the dominant proprietary manufacturer drives customers away from
1071 competitors - by sowing fear, uncertainty and doubt about other
1072 software's long-term viability - is ineffective with respect to GPL'd
1073 programs. Users of GPL'd code, including those who purchase software
1074 and systems from a commercial reseller, know that future improvements
1075 and repairs will be accessible from the commons, and need not fear
1076 either the disappearance of their supplier or that someone will use a
1077 particularly attractive improvement or a desperately necessary repair
1078 as leverage for "taking the program private."</para>
1079
1080 <para>This use of intellectual property rules to create a commons in
1081 cyberspace is the central institutional structure enabling the
1082 anarchist triumph. Ensuring free access and enabling modification at
1083 each stage in the process means that the evolution of software occurs
1084 in the fast Lamarckian mode: each favorable acquired characteristic of
1085 others' work can be directly inherited. Hence the speed with which the
1086 Linux kernel, for example, outgrew all of its proprietary
1087 predecessors. Because defection is impossible, free riders are
1088 welcome, which resolves one of the central puzzles of collective
1089 action in a propertarian social system.</para>
1090
1091 <para>Non-propertarian production is also directly responsible for the
1092 famous stability and reliability of free software, which arises from
1093 what Eric Raymond calls "Linus' law": With enough eyeballs, all bugs
1094 are shallow. In practical terms, access to source code means that if I
1095 have a problem I can fix it. Because I can fix it, I almost never have
1096 to, because someone else has almost always seen it and fixed it
1097 first.</para>
1098
1099 <para>For the free software community, commitment to anarchist
1100 production may be a moral imperative; as Richard Stallman wrote, it's
1101 about freedom, not about price. Or it may be a matter of utility,
1102 seeking to produce better software than propertarian modes of work
1103 will allow. From the droid point of view, the copyleft represents the
1104 perversion of theory, but better than any other proposal over the past
1105 decades it resolves the problems of applying copyright to the
1106 inextricably merged functional and expressive features of computer
1107 programs. That it produces better software than the alternative does
1108 not imply that traditional copyright principles should now be
1109 prohibited to those who want to own and market inferior software
1110 products, or (more charitably) whose products are too narrow in appeal
1111 for communal production. But our story should serve as a warning to
1112 droids: The world of the future will bear little relation to the world
1113 of the past. The rules are now being bent in two directions. The
1114 corporate owners of "cultural icons" and other assets who seek
1115 ever-longer terms for corporate authors, converting the "limited Time"
1116 of Article I, §8 into a freehold have naturally been whistling music
1117 to the android ear <footnote> <para>26. The looming expiration of
1118 Mickey Mouse's ownership by Disney requires, from the point of view of
1119 that wealthy "campaign contributor," for example, an alteration of the
1120 general copyright law of the United States. See "Not Making it Any
1121 More? Vaporizing the Public Domain," in <emphasis>The Invisible
1122 Barbecue</emphasis>, forthcoming.</para> </footnote> . After all, who bought
1123 the droids their concert tickets? But as the propertarian position
1124 seeks to embed itself ever more strongly, in a conception of copyright
1125 liberated from the minor annoyances of limited terms and fair use, at
1126 the very center of our "cultural software" system, the anarchist
1127 counter-strike has begun. Worse is yet to befall the droids, as we
1128 shall see. But first, we must pay our final devoirs to the
1129 dwarves.</para>
1130
1131 </section>
1132 <section>
1133 <title>Because It's There: Faraday's Magnet and Human Creativity</title>
1134
1135 <para>After all, they deserve an answer. Why do people make free
1136 software if they don't get to profit? Two answers have usually been
1137 given. One is half-right and the other is wrong, but both are
1138 insufficiently simple.</para>
1139
1140 <para>The wrong answer is embedded in numerous references to "the
1141 hacker gift-exchange culture." This use of ethnographic jargon
1142 wandered into the field some years ago and became rapidly, if
1143 misleadingly, ubiquitous. It reminds us only that the
1144 economeretricians have so corrupted our thought processes that any
1145 form of non-market economic behavior seems equal to every other
1146 kind. But gift-exchange, like market barter, is a propertarian
1147 institution. Reciprocity is central to these symbolic enactments of
1148 mutual dependence, and if either the yams or the fish are
1149 short-weighted, trouble results. Free software, at the risk of
1150 repetition, is a commons: no reciprocity ritual is enacted there. A
1151 few people give away code that others sell, use, change, or borrow
1152 wholesale to lift out parts for something else. Notwithstanding the
1153 very large number of people (tens of thousands, at most) who have
1154 contributed to GNU/Linux, this is orders of magnitude less than the
1155 number of users who make no contribution whatever <footnote>
1156 <para>27. A recent industry estimate puts the number of Linux systems
1157 worldwide at 7.5 million. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Josh McHugh, 1998. <ulink
1158 url="http://www.forbes.com/forbes/98/0810/6203094s1.htm">"Linux: The
1159 Making of a Global Hack,"</ulink> <emphasis>Forbes</emphasis> (August 10). Because the
1160 software is freely obtainable throughout the Net, there is no simple
1161 way to assess actual usage.</para> </footnote>.</para>
1162
1163 <para>A part of the right answer is suggested by the claim that free
1164 software is made by those who seek reputational compensation for their
1165 activity. Famous Linux hackers, the theory is, are known all over the
1166 planet as programming deities. From this they derive either enhanced
1167 self-esteem or indirect material advancement <footnote> <para>28. Eric
1168 Raymond is a partisan of the "ego boost" theory, to which he adds
1169 another faux-ethnographic comparison, of free software composition to
1170 the Kwakiutl potlatch. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Eric S. Raymond, 1998. <ulink
1171 url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue3_10/raymond/index.html">Homesteading
1172 the Noosphere.</ulink>. But the potlatch, certainly a form of status
1173 competition, is unlike free software for two fundamental reasons: it
1174 is essentially hierarchical, which free software is not, and, as we
1175 have known since Thorstein Veblen first called attention to its
1176 significance, it is a form of conspicuous waste. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Thorstein
1177 Veblen, 1967. <emphasis>The Theory of the Leisure Class.</emphasis> New York:
1178 Viking, p. 75. These are precisely the grounds which distinguish the
1179 anti-hierarchical and utilitiarian free software culture from its
1180 propertarian counterparts.</para></footnote>. But the programming
1181 deities, much as they have contributed to free software, have not done
1182 the bulk of the work. Reputations, as Linus Torvalds himself has often
1183 pointed out, are made by willingly acknowledging that it was all done
1184 by someone else. And, as many observers have noted, the free software
1185 movement has also produced superlative
1186 documentation. Documentation-writing is not what hackers do to attain
1187 cool, and much of the documentation has been written by people who
1188 didn't write the code. Nor must we limit the indirect material
1189 advantages of authorship to increases in reputational capital. Most
1190 free software authors I know have day jobs in the technology
1191 industries, and the skills they hone in the more creative work they do
1192 outside the market no doubt sometimes measurably enhance their value
1193 within it. And as the free software products gained critical mass and
1194 became the basis of a whole new set of business models built around
1195 commercial distribution of that which people can also get for nothing,
1196 an increasing number of people are specifically employed to write free
1197 software. But in order to be employable in the field, they must
1198 already have established themselves there. Plainly, then, this motive
1199 is present, but it isn't the whole explanation.</para>
1200
1201 <para>Indeed, the rest of the answer is just too simple to have
1202 received its due. The best way to understand is to follow the brief
1203 and otherwise unsung career of an initially-grudging free software
1204 author. Microsoft's Vinod Vallopillil, in the course of writing the
1205 competitive analysis of Linux that was leaked as the second of the
1206 famous "Halloween memoranda," bought and installed a Linux system on
1207 one of his office computers. He had trouble because the (commercial)
1208 Linux distribution he installed did not contain a daemon to handle the
1209 DHCP protocol for assignment of dynamic IP addresses. The result was
1210 important enough for us to risk another prolonged exposure to the
1211 Microsoft Writing Style:</para>
1212
1213 <blockquote><para>A small number of Web sites and FAQs later, I found an FTP
1214 site with a Linux DHCP client. The DHCP client was developed by an
1215 engineer employed by Fore Systems (as evidenced by his e-mail address;
1216 I believe, however, that it was developed in his own free time). A
1217 second set of documentation/manuals was written for the DHCP client by
1218 a hacker in <emphasis>Hungary</emphasis> which provided relatively simple
1219 instructions on how to install/load the client.</para>
1220
1221 <para>I downloaded &amp; uncompressed the client and typed two
1222 simple commands:</para>
1223
1224 <para>Make - compiles the client binaries</para>
1225
1226 <para>Make Install -installed the binaries as a Linux Daemon</para>
1227
1228 <para>Typing "DHCPCD" (for DHCP Client Daemon) on the command
1229 line triggered the DHCP discovery process and voila, I had IP
1230 networking running. </para>
1231
1232 <para>Since I had just downloaded the DHCP client code, on an
1233 impulse I played around a bit. Although the client wasn't as
1234 extensible as the DHCP client we are shipping in NT5 (for example, it
1235 won't query for arbitrary options &amp; store results), it was obvious
1236 how I could write the additional code to implement this functionality.
1237 The full client consisted of about 2,600 lines of code.</para>
1238
1239 <para>One example of esoteric, extended functionality that was
1240 clearly patched in by a third party was a set of routines to that
1241 would pad the DHCP request with host-specific strings required by
1242 Cable Modem / ADSL sites.</para>
1243
1244 <para>A few other steps were required to configure the DHCP
1245 client to auto-start and auto-configure my Ethernet interface on boot
1246 but these were documented in the client code and in the DHCP
1247 documentation from the Hungarian developer.</para>
1248
1249 <para>I'm a poorly skilled UNIX programmer but it was
1250 immediately obvious to me how to incrementally extend the DHCP client
1251 code (the feeling was exhilarating and addictive).</para>
1252
1253 <para>Additionally, due directly to GPL + having the full development
1254 environment in front of me, I was in a position where I could write up
1255 my changes and e-mail them out within a couple of hours (in contrast
1256 to how things like this would get done in NT). Engaging in that
1257 process would have prepared me for a larger, more ambitious Linux
1258 project in the future <footnote><para>29. Vinod Vallopillil, <ulink
1259 url="http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween2.html">Linux OS
1260 Competitive Analysis (Halloween II).</ulink> Note Vallopillil's
1261 surprise that a program written in California had been subsequently
1262 documented by a programmer in Hungary.</para>
1263 </footnote>.</para></blockquote>
1264
1265 <para>"The feeling was exhilarating and addictive." Stop the presses:
1266 Microsoft experimentally verifies Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to
1267 Faraday's Law. Wrap the Internet around every brain on the planet and
1268 spin the planet. Software flows in the wires. It's an emergent
1269 property of human minds to create. "Due directly to the GPL," as
1270 Vallopillil rightly pointed out, free software made available to him
1271 an exhilarating increase in his own creativity, of a kind not
1272 achievable in his day job working for the Greatest Programming Company
1273 on Earth. If only he had e-mailed that first addictive fix, who knows
1274 where he'd be now?</para>
1275
1276 <para>So, in the end, my dwarvish friends, it's just a human thing.
1277 Rather like why Figaro sings, why Mozart wrote the music for him to
1278 sing to, and why we all make up new words: Because we can. Homo
1279 ludens, meet Homo faber. The social condition of global
1280 interconnection that we call the Internet makes it possible for all of
1281 us to be creative in new and previously undreamed-of ways. Unless we
1282 allow "ownership" to interfere. Repeat after me, ye dwarves and men:
1283 Resist the resistance!</para>
1284
1285 </section>
1286 <!--<para><img src="anarchism_files/quad.gif"></para><a name="m4"></a>-->
1287
1288 <section>
1289 <title>IV. Their Lordships Die in the Dark?</title>
1290
1291 <para>For the IPdroid, fresh off the plane from a week at Bellagio
1292 paid for by Dreamworks SKG, it's enough to cause indigestion.</para>
1293
1294 <para>Unlock the possibilities of human creativity by connecting
1295 everyone to everyone else? Get the ownership system out of the way so
1296 that we can all add our voices to the choir, even if that means
1297 pasting our singing on top of the Mormon Tabernacle and sending the
1298 output to a friend? No one sitting slack-jawed in front of a televised
1299 mixture of violence and imminent copulation carefully devised to
1300 heighten the young male eyeball's interest in a beer commercial? What
1301 will become of civilization? Or at least of copyright teachers?</para>
1302
1303 <para>But perhaps this is premature. I've only been talking about
1304 software. Real software, the old kind, that runs computers. Not like
1305 the software that runs DVD players, or the kind made by the Grateful
1306 Dead. "Oh yes, the Grateful Dead. Something strange about them, wasn't
1307 there? Didn't prohibit recording at their concerts. Didn't mind if
1308 their fans rather riled the recording industry. Seem to have done all
1309 right, though, you gotta admit. Senator Patrick Leahy, isn't he a
1310 former Deadhead? I wonder if he'll vote to extend corporate authorship
1311 terms to 125 years, so that Disney doesn't lose The Mouse in 2004. And
1312 those DVD players - they're computers, aren't they?"</para>
1313
1314 <para>In the digital society, it's all connected. We can't depend for
1315 the long run on distinguishing one bitstream from another in order to
1316 figure out which rules apply. What happened to software is already
1317 happening to music. Their recording industry lordships are now
1318 scrambling wildly to retain control over distribution, as both
1319 musicians and listeners realize that the middlepeople are no longer
1320 necessary. The Great Potemkin Village of 1999, the so-called Secure
1321 Digital Music Initiative, will have collapsed long before the first
1322 Internet President gets inaugurated, for simple technical reasons as
1323 obvious to those who know as the ones that dictated the triumph of
1324 free software <footnote> <para>30. See "They're Playing Our Song: The
1325 Day the Music Industry Died," in <emphasis>The Invisible Barbecue</emphasis>,
1326 forthcoming.</para> </footnote> . The anarchist revolution in music is
1327 different from the one in software <emphasis>tout court</emphasis>, but here too -
1328 as any teenager with an MP3 collection of self-released music from
1329 unsigned artists can tell you - theory has been killed off by the
1330 facts. Whether you are Mick Jagger, or a great national artist from
1331 the third world looking for a global audience, or a garret-dweller
1332 reinventing music, the recording industry will soon have nothing to
1333 offer you that you can't get better for free. And music doesn't sound
1334 worse when distributed for free, pay what you want directly to the
1335 artist, and don't pay anything if you don't want to. Give it to your
1336 friends; they might like it.</para>
1337
1338 <para>
1339 What happened to music is also happening to news. The wire services,
1340 as any U.S. law student learns even before taking the near-obligatory
1341 course in Copyright for Droids, have a protectible property interest
1342 in their expression of the news, even if not in the facts the news
1343 reports <footnote><para>31. International News Service v. Associated
1344 Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). With regard to the actual terse, purely
1345 functional expressions of breaking news actually at stake in the
1346 jostling among wire services, this was always a distinction only a
1347 droid could love.</para></footnote>. So why are they now giving all
1348 their output away? Because in the world of the Net, most news is
1349 commodity news. And the original advantage of the news gatherers, that
1350 they were internally connected in ways others were not when
1351 communications were expensive, is gone. Now what matters is collecting
1352 eyeballs to deliver to advertisers. It isn't the wire services that
1353 have the advantage in covering Kosovo, that's for sure. Much less
1354 those paragons of "intellectual" property, their television
1355 lordships. They, with their overpaid pretty people and their massive
1356 technical infrastructure, are about the only organizations in the
1357 world that can't afford to be everywhere all the time. And then they
1358 have to limit themselves to ninety seconds a story, or the eyeball
1359 hunters will go somewhere else. So who makes better news, the
1360 propertarians or the anarchists? We shall soon see.</para>
1361
1362 <para>Oscar Wilde says somewhere that the problem with socialism is
1363 that it takes up too many evenings. The problems with anarchism as a
1364 social system are also about transaction costs. But the digital
1365 revolution alters two aspects of political economy that have been
1366 otherwise invariant throughout human history. All software has zero
1367 marginal cost in the world of the Net, while the costs of social
1368 coordination have been so far reduced as to permit the rapid formation
1369 and dissolution of large-scale and highly diverse social groupings
1370 entirely without geographic limitation <footnote> <para>32. See "No
1371 Prodigal Son: The Political Theory of Universal Interconnection," in
1372 <emphasis>The Invisible Barbecue</emphasis>, forthcoming.</para> </footnote> . Such
1373 fundamental change in the material circumstances of life necessarily
1374 produces equally fundamental changes in culture. Think not? Tell it to
1375 the Iroquois. And of course such profound shifts in culture are
1376 threats to existing power relations. Think not? Ask the Chinese
1377 Communist Party. Or wait 25 years and see if you can find them for
1378 purposes of making the inquiry.</para>
1379
1380 <para>In this context, the obsolescence of the IPdroid is neither
1381 unforseeable nor tragic. Indeed it may find itself clanking off into
1382 the desert, still lucidly explaining to an imaginary room the
1383 profitably complicated rules for a world that no longer exists. But at
1384 least it will have familiar company, recognizable from all those
1385 glittering parties in Davos, Hollywood, and Brussels. Our Media Lords
1386 are now at handigrips with fate, however much they may feel that the
1387 Force is with them. The rules about bitstreams are now of dubious
1388 utility for maintaining power by co-opting human creativity. Seen
1389 clearly in the light of fact, these Emperors have even fewer clothes
1390 than the models they use to grab our eyeballs. Unless supported by
1391 user-disabling technology, a culture of pervasive surveillance that
1392 permits every reader of every "property" to be logged and charged, and
1393 a smokescreen of droid-breath assuring each and every young person
1394 that human creativity would vanish without the benevolent aristocracy
1395 of BillG the Creator, Lord Murdoch of Everywhere, the Spielmeister and
1396 the Lord High Mouse, their reign is nearly done. But what's at stake
1397 is the control of the scarcest resource of all: our
1398 attention. Conscripting that makes all the money in the world in the
1399 digital economy, and the current lords of the earth will fight for
1400 it. Leagued against them are only the anarchists: nobodies, hippies,
1401 hobbyists, lovers, and artists. The resulting unequal contest is the
1402 great political and legal issue of our time. Aristocracy looks hard
1403 to beat, but that's how it looked in 1788 and 1913 too. It is, as Chou
1404 En-Lai said about the meaning of the French Revolution, too soon to
1405 tell.</para>
1406
1407 </section>
1408 <section>
1409 <title>About the Author</title>
1410
1411 <para>Eben Moglen is Professor of Law &amp; Legal History, Columbia Law School.
1412 E-mail: <ulink url="mailto:moglen@columbia.edu">Mail: moglen@columbia.edu</ulink></para>
1413
1414 <para>Acknowledgments</para>
1415
1416 <para>This paper was prepared for delivery at the Buchmann
1417 International Conference on Law, Technology and Information, at Tel
1418 Aviv University, May 1999; my thanks to the organizers for their kind
1419 invitation. I owe much as always to Pamela Karlan for her insight and
1420 encouragement. I especially wish to thank the programmers throughout
1421 the world who made free software possible.</para>
1422
1423
1424 <blockquote>
1425 <para>
1426 <ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/index.html"><!--<img src="anarchism_files/contents.gif" alt="Contents" align="bottom" border="0">--></ulink> </para>
1427 <para>
1428 <ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/index.html"><!--<img src="anarchism_files/index.gif" alt="Index" border="0">--></ulink>
1429 </para>
1430 <para>Copyright <ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/copy.html">©</ulink> 1999, First Monday</para></blockquote>
1431
1432
1433 </section>
1434</article>
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