source: non-gtk/emoglen/anarchism.bg.xml@ 1148

Last change on this file since 1148 was 1148, checked in by Александър Шопов, 19 years ago

r1307@kochinka: ash | 2007-05-31 05:53:04 +0300
anarchism: няколко абзаца.

  • Property svn:keywords set to Id
File size: 96.8 KB
Line 
1<?xml version="1.0" standalone="no"?>
2<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN" "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
3]>
4<article lang="bg">
5 <title>Триумфиращият анархизъм</title>
6 <articleinfo>
7 <releaseinfo>$Id: anarchism.bg.xml 1148 2007-06-02 04:37:43Z ash $</releaseinfo>
8 </articleinfo>
9
10 <!-- <html><head> -->
11 <!-- base
12 href="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html"
13 -->
14
15 <!--
16 <meta name="Description" content="This paper shows why free software, far from
17 being a marginal participant in the commercial software market, is the
18 first step in the withering away of the intellectual property system.">
19 <meta name="Keywords" content="anarchism triumphant, free software, death of copyright, Linux operating system kernel, software as property, article">
20 <meta name="DC.Title" content="Anarchism triumphant">
21 <meta name="DC.Title" content="Free software and the death of copyright">
22 <meta name="DC.Creator" content="Moglen, Eben">
23 <meta name="DC.Subject" content="anarchism triumphant, free software, death of copyright, Linux operating system kernel, software as property, article">
24 <meta name="DC.Description" content="This paper shows why free software, far from being a marginal participant in the commercial software market, is the
25 first step in the withering away of the intellectual property system.">
26 <meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Valauskas, Edward J.">
27 <meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Dyson, Esther">
28 <meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Ghosh, Rishab Aiyer">
29 <meta name="DC.Date" content="1999-08-02">
30 <meta name="DC.Type" content="text">
31 <meta name="DC.Format" content="text/html">
32 <meta name="DC.Identifier" content="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html">
33 <meta name="DC.Language" content="en">
34 <meta name="DC.Relation" content="IsPartOf First Monday, vol 4, no. 8"></head><body alink="#ffee99" bgcolor="#ffffff" link="#bb7777" text="#000000" vlink="#7777bb">
35
36<blockquote><img src="anarchism_files/logo.gif" alt="First Monday" align="bottom" border="0" height="40" width="256"><br>
37
38</blockquote>
39 -->
40
41
42 <para><ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html#author"><!-- <img src="anarchism_files/moglen.gif" alt="Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright" border="0">--> </ulink></para>
43
44 <blockquote><para>Разпространението на ядрото за операционни системи
45 Линукс насочи вниманието към движението за свободен софтуер. Това есе
46 показва защо свободният софтуер, който далеч не е нищожен участник в
47 пазара на комерсиален софтуер, е важната първа стъпка в премахването
48 на системата на интелектуална собственост.</para></blockquote>
49
50 <section>
51 <title>Софтуерът като собственост: Теоретичният парадокс</title>
52
53 <para><emphasis>Софтуер</emphasis>: никоя друга дума не въплъщава
54 толкова пълно рактическите и социалните ефекти на цифровата революция.
55 Първоначално терминът е бил чисто технически и е означавал частите на
56 една компютърна система, която за разлика от "хардуера" -- направен
57 непроменим от производителя си в електрониката на системата, е можел
58 свободно да бъде променян. Първият софтуер е представлявал начина на
59 включване на кабели и прекъсвачи на външните панели на електронни
60 устройства, но още с появата на езикови средства за промяната на
61 поведението на компютъра, "софтуер" започнал да обозначава предимно
62 изразяванията в повече или по-малко понятех за хората език, който
63 както описвал, така и контролирал поведението на машината<footnote>
64 <para>1. Тази отлика е била само приблизителна в първоначалния
65 контекст. В края на 60-те определена част от основните операции
66 на хардуера са контролирани от програми, които са цифрово кодирани
67 в електрониката на компютърното оборудване, които не могат да
68 бъдат променяни веднъж след като продукцията е излязла от
69 фабриката. Такива символни, но непроменими компоненти, са били
70 известни като "микрокод" на жаргона на индустрията, но стана
71 обичайно те да се наричат "фърмуеър". Изменчивостта, както бе
72 показано от термина "фърмуеър" (# БЕЛЕЖКА ЗА ЗНАЧЕНИЕТО НА
73 КОРЕНИТЕ НА ДУМИТЕ СОФТУЕР, ХАРДУЕР, ФЪРМУЕР),се отнася главно към
74 възможността на потребителите да изменят символите, които
75 определят поведението на машината. Понеже цифровата революция
76 доведе до широката употреба на компютрите от технически
77 некомпетентни лица, повечето от традиционния софтуер -- приложни
78 програми, операционни системи, инструкции за числово управление и
79 т. н. -- е, за повечето от потребителите си, фърмуер. Може да е
80 символен, а не електронен в начина, по който е направен, но те не
81 могат да го променят, дори и да искат, нещо което те често, но
82 безсилно и с негодуванние правят. Това "затвърдяване на софтуера"
83 е основното условие на собственическия подход към законовата
84 организация на цифровото обществео, което е темата на този
85 доклад.</para></footnote>.</para>
86
87 <para>Така е било тогава, а сега е така: технологиите базирани на
88 обработката на информация кодирана в цифров вид сега е социално
89 доминираща в повечето аспекти на човешката култура в "развитите"
90 общества. <footnote><para>2. В рамките на сегашното поколение,
91 самата концепция за социално "равитие" се измества от притежанието
92 на индустрия основана на двигател с вътрешно горене към
93 "пост-индустрия" базирана на цифровите комуникации и свързаните с
94 тях форми на икономическа дейност, основани на
95 "знания".</para></footnote>. Преминаването от аналогово към
96 цифрово представяне -- във видеото, музиката, печатането,
97 телекомуникациите и дори хореографията, религиозните церемонии и
98 сексуалното задоволяване (# religious worship, sexual
99 gratification) -- потенциално превръща всички форми на човешката
100 символна дейност във софтуер, то ест -- променими инструкции за
101 описание и управление на поведението на машините. Чрез
102 концептуално постформиране, характено за западното научно мислене,
103 разделението между хардуера и софтуера се наблюдава в природния
104 или социалния свят и е станал нов начин за изразяване на конфликта
105 между идеите на детерминизъм и свободната воля, природата и
106 възпитанието, или гените и културата. (# Какво е backformation?
107 Аналог на transformation ли? By a conceptual back-formation
108 characteristic of Western scientistic thinking, the division
109 between hardware and software is now being observed in the natural
110 or social world, and has become a new way to express the conflict
111 between ideas of determinism and free will, nature and nurture, or
112 genes and culture.) Нашият "хардуер", който е генетично зададен е
113 нашата природа и ни определя. Нашето възпитание е "софтуера",
114 който задава културното ни прграмиране, което е нашата относителна
115 свобода. И така нататък, за неразумно дърдорещите. (# And so on,
116 for those reckless of blather).<footnote><para>3. Всъщност, едно
117 бързо замисляне ще разкрие, че нашите гени са фърмуеър.
118 Еволюцията направи прехода от аналогово към цифрово още преди
119 периода на първите вкаменелости. Но ние не притежавахме властта
120 за управлявани, преки промени. До завчера. През следващото
121 столетие гените също ще се превърнат в софтуер и въпреки че не
122 разглеждам проблема по нататък в това есе, политиеските
123 последствия на несвободността на софтуера в този контекст са още
124 по-плашещи в сравнение с културните артефакти.</para></footnote>
125 Този "софтуер" се превръща в жизнеспособна метафора за цялата
126 символна активност, която очевидно е разведена (еманципирана) от
127 техническия контекст на произхода на думата, въпреки неудобството,
128 което се появява в технически компетентните, когато термина влиза
129 в устите на хората, като се изпуска концептуалното значение на
130 неговия произход.<footnote><para>4. <emphasis>Виж
131 напр.:</emphasis> J. M. Balkin, 1998. <emphasis>Cultural Software:
132 a Theory of Ideology.</emphasis> New Haven: Yale University
133 Press.</para></footnote></para>
134
135
136 <para>Но широкото възприемане на използването на цифровите
137 технологии от тези, които не разбират принципите на действието им,
138 въпреки, че лицензира (#позволява, licenses) широкото метафорично
139 наемане на "софтуера", всъщност не ни позволява да забравим, че
140 сега компютрите са навсякъде под нашата социална кожа. Движението
141 от аналогово към цифрово е по-важно за структурата на социалните и
142 юридическите отношения отколкото по известното, но по-несигурно
143 преминаване от статс към договор (# from status to contract)
144 <footnote><para>5. <emphasis>Виж</emphasis> Henry Sumner Maine,
145 1861. <emphasis>Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History
146 of Society, and Its Relation to Modern Idea.</emphasis> First
147 edition. London: J. Murray.</para></footnote>. Това са лоши
148 новини за тези правни мислители, които не го разбират, и което е
149 причината толкова много преструване на разбиране така добре да
150 процъфтява. Потенциално обаче, нашето велико преминаване е много
151 добра новина за тези, които могат да превърнат новооткритата земя
152 в своя собственост. Това е и причината текущите "притежатели" на
153 софтуера толкова силно да поддържат и насърчават невежеството на
154 всички останали. За тяхно нещастие -- по причини известни на
155 правните теоретици, които все още не са разбрали как да прилагат
156 традиционната си логика в тази сфера -- трикът няма да се
157 задейства. Това есе обяснява защо<footnote><para>6. По принцип не
158 харесвам вмъкването на автобиография в изследователската дейност.
159 Но понеже това тук е мое тъжно задължение, а и голямо удоволствие
160 да оспоря квалифицираността или <emphasis>bona fide-то</emphasis>
161 на кажи-речи всеки, трябва да си позволя преценка на себе си. За
162 първи път бях изложен на занаята (#вещината - craft) на
163 компютърното програмиране през 1971г. Започнах да получавам
164 надник като комерсиален програмист през 1973г. -- на възраст от 13
165 г. и продълавах така в разнообразие от компютърни услуги,
166 инжинерство и многонационални технологически предрпиятия
167 (#enerprises) до 1985г. През 1975 спомогнах за написването на
168 една от първите системи за електронна поща в САЩ. От 1979г. бях
169 зает с проучването и разработката на висши компютърни езици за
170 програмиране в Ай Би Ем. Тези дейности направиха икономически
171 възможно за мен да изучавам и I was
172 engaged in research and development of advanced computer
173 programming languages at IBM. These activities made it
174 economically possible for me to study the arts of historical
175 scholarship and legal cunning. My wages were sufficient to pay my
176 tuitions, but not - to anticipate an argument that will be made by
177 the econodwarves further along - because my programs were the
178 intellectual property of my employer, but rather because they made
179 the hardware my employer sold work better. Most of what I wrote
180 was effectively free software, as we shall see. Although I
181 subsequently made some inconsiderable technical contributions to
182 the actual free software movement this paper describes, my primary
183 activities on its behalf have been legal: I have served for the
184 past five years (without pay, naturally) as general counsel of the
185 Free Software Foundation.</para></footnote>.</para>
186
187 <para>Трябва да започнем като разгледаме техническата същност на
188 подобните устройства, които ни заобикалят в ерата на
189 <quote>софтуера в културата</quote>. CD плеърът е добър пример.
190 Основният мъ вход е поток от битове, който се чете от оптичен диск
191 за съхрание на дании. Този поток описва музиката във вид на
192 замервания, които се правят 44000 пъти в секунда на честотата и
193 амплитудата на два аудио канала. Основният изход на плеъра е
194 аналоговия аудио изход. <footnote><para>7. Естествено - плеърът
195 има вторични входове и изходи на контролни канали - бутоните и
196 инфрачервения датчик за дистанционното управление са входове, а
197 дисплея за времето и поредната песен са
198 изходи..</para></footnote>. Както всичко друго в цифровия свят,
199 музиката както бива видяна от CD плеъра, е просто информация във
200 вид на исла - един популярен запис на Деветата симфония на
201 Бетовен, записана от Артуро Тосканини и Симфоничния оркестър и хор
202 на Ен Би Си е (като пропуснем няколко незначителни цифри)
203 1276749873424, а особенно перверзният последен запис на Глен Гуд
204 на Вариациите на Голдбърг е също доста съкратен вид)
205 767459083268.</para>
206
207 <para>Колкото и да е странно, тези две числа са <quote>покрити от
208 авторското право</quote>. Това хипотетично (би трябвало/разбираш
209 ли/supposedly FIXME) да означава, че не можете да притежавате
210 друго копие на тези числа след като веднъж са въплатени в някаква
211 физическа форма, освен ако не сте ги лицензирали. А и не можете
212 да преобразувате 767459083268 в 2347895697 за вашите приятели (за
213 да поправите нелепия избор на Гуд за темпото), без да създадете
214 <quote>творба основана на друга</quote> (derivative
215 work FIXME), за което е необходим лиценз.</para>
216
217 <para>По същото време (FIXME At the same time) пообен оптичен диск
218 за съхранение на данни съдържа друго число, нека това да е
219 7537489532. Това е алгоритъмът за линейно програмиране на големи
220 системи с множество ограничения, който е полезен например, когато
221 искате да постигнете оптимално ползване на оборотните запаси
222 (FIXNE rolling stock) при управлението на товарна железница. Това
223 число САЩ) е <quote>патентовано</quote>, което означава, че не
224 можете да получите числото 7537489532 за себе си или по някакъв
225 друг начин да <quote>упражнявате занаята</quote> (FIXME "practice
226 the art") на патента що се отнася до решаването на проблеми в
227 областта на линейното програмиране, независимо как сте достигнали
228 до идеята, дори и сами да сте се сетили, освен ако нямате лиценз
229 от притежателя на числото.</para>
230
231 <para>А идва и 9892454959483. Това е изходния код на програмата
232 Word на Майкрософт. Освен че <quote>подналежи на авторско
233 право</quote>, числото е й търговска тайна, което означава, че ако
234 го вземете от Майкрософт и го дадете на някой друг, можете да
235 бъдете наказан.</para>
236
237 <para>И най-накрая - ето го и числото 588832161316. То не прави
238 нищо и е просто 767354 на квадрат. Доколкото ми е известно, то не
239 е притежавано по горнит параграфи от никой. Поне засега.</para>
240
241 <para>At this point we must deal with our first objection from the
242 learned. It comes from a creature known as the IPdroid. The droid has
243 a sophisticated mind and a cultured life. It appreciates very much the
244 elegant dinners at academic and ministerial conferences about the
245 TRIPs, not to mention the privilege of frequent appearances on MSNBC.
246 It wants you to know that I'm committing the mistake of confusing the
247 embodiment with the intellectual property itself. It's not the number
248 that's patented, stupid, just the Kamarkar algorithm. The number
249 <emphasis>can</emphasis> be copyrighted, because copyright covers the
250 expressive qualities of a particular tangible embodiment of an idea
251 (in which some functional properties may be mysteriously merged,
252 provided that they're not too merged), but not the algorithm. Whereas
253 the number isn't patentable, just the "teaching" of the number with
254 respect to making railroads run on time. And the number representing
255 the source code of Microsoft Word can be a trade secret, but if you
256 find it out for yourself (by performing arithmetic manipulation of
257 other numbers issued by Microsoft, for example, which is known as
258 "reverse engineering"), you're not going to be punished, at least if
259 you live in some parts of the United States.</para>
260
261 <para>This droid, like other droids, is often right. The condition of
262 being a droid is to know everything about something and nothing about
263 anything else. By its timely and urgent intervention the droid has
264 established that the current intellectual property system contains
265 many intricate and ingenious features. The complexities combine to
266 allow professors to be erudite, Congressmen to get campaign
267 contributions, lawyers to wear nice suits and tassel loafers, and
268 Murdoch to be rich. The complexities mostly evolved in an age of
269 industrial information distribution, when information was inscribed in
270 analog forms on physical objects that cost something significant to
271 make, move, and sell. When applied to digital information that moves
272 frictionlessly through the network and has zero marginal cost per
273 copy, everything still works, mostly, as long as you don't stop
274 squinting.</para>
275
276 <para>But that wasn't what I was arguing about. I wanted to point out
277 something else: that our world consists increasingly of nothing but
278 large numbers (also known as bitstreams), and that - for reasons
279 having nothing to do with emergent properties of the numbers
280 themselves - the legal system is presently committed to treating
281 similar numbers radically differently. No one can tell, simply by
282 looking at a number that is 100 million digits long, whether that
283 number is subject to patent, copyright, or trade secret protection, or
284 indeed whether it is "owned" by anyone at all. So the legal system we
285 have - blessed as we are by its consequences if we are copyright
286 teachers, Congressmen, Gucci-gulchers or Big Rupert himself - is
287 compelled to treat indistinguishable things in unlike ways.</para>
288
289 <para>Now, in my role as a legal historian concerned with the secular
290 (that is, very long term) development of legal thought, I claim that
291 legal regimes based on sharp but unpredictable distinctions among
292 similar objects are radically unstable. They fall apart over time
293 because every instance of the rules' application is an invitation to
294 at least one side to claim that instead of fitting in ideal category A
295 the particular object in dispute should be deemed to fit instead in
296 category B, where the rules will be more favorable to the party making
297 the claim. This game - about whether a typewriter should be deemed a
298 musical instrument for purposes of railway rate regulation, or whether
299 a steam shovel is a motor vehicle - is the frequent stuff of legal
300 ingenuity. But when the conventionally-approved legal categories
301 require judges to distinguish among the identical, the game is
302 infinitely lengthy, infinitely costly, and almost infinitely offensive
303 to the unbiased bystander <footnote><para>8. This is not an insight
304 unique to our present enterprise. A closely-related idea forms one of
305 the most important principles in the history of Anglo-American law,
306 perfectly put by Toby Milsom in the following terms:</para>
307 <blockquote><para>The life of the common law has been in the abuse of
308 its elementary ideas. If the rules of property give what now seems an
309 unjust answer, try obligation; and equity has proved that from the
310 materials of obligation you can counterfeit the phenomena of
311 property. If the rules of contract give what now seems an unjust
312 answer, try tort. ... If the rules of one tort, say deceit, give what
313 now seems an unjust answer, try another, try negligence. And so the
314 legal world goes round.</para></blockquote><para>S.F.C. Milsom,
315 1981. <emphasis>Historical Foundations of the Common Law.</emphasis>
316 Second edition. London: Butterworths, p. 6.</para> </footnote>.</para>
317
318 <para>Thus parties can spend all the money they want on all the
319 legislators and judges they can afford - which for the new "owners" of
320 the digital world is quite a few - but the rules they buy aren't going
321 to work in the end. Sooner or later, the paradigms are going to
322 collapse. Of course, if later means two generations from now, the
323 distribution of wealth and power sanctified in the meantime may not be
324 reversible by any course less drastic than a <emphasis>bellum
325 servile</emphasis> of couch potatoes against media magnates. So
326 knowing that history isn't on Bill Gates' side isn't enough. We are
327 predicting the future in a very limited sense: we know that the
328 existing rules, which have yet the fervor of conventional belief
329 solidly enlisted behind them, are no longer meaningful. Parties will
330 use and abuse them freely until the mainstream of "respectable"
331 conservative opinion acknowledges their death, with uncertain
332 results. But realistic scholarship should already be turning its
333 attention to the clear need for new thoughtways.</para>
334
335 <para>When we reach this point in the argument, we find ourselves
336 contending with the other primary protagonist of educated idiocy: the
337 econodwarf. Like the IPdroid, the econodwarf is a species of hedgehog,
338 <footnote><para>9. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Isaiah Berlin,
339 1953. <emphasis>The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View
340 of History.</emphasis> New York: Simon and Schuster.</para>
341 </footnote> but where the droid is committed to logic over experience,
342 the econodwarf specializes in an energetic and well-focused but
343 entirely erroneous view of human nature. According to the econodwarf's
344 vision, each human being is an individual possessing "incentives,"
345 which can be retrospectively unearthed by imagining the state of the
346 bank account at various times. So in this instance the econodwarf
347 feels compelled to object that without the rules I am lampooning,
348 there would be no incentive to create the things the rules treat as
349 property: without the ability to exclude others from music there would
350 be no music, because no one could be sure of getting paid for creating
351 it.</para>
352
353 <para>Music is not really our subject; the software I am considering
354 at the moment is the old kind: computer programs. But as he is
355 determined to deal at least cursorily with the subject, and because,
356 as we have seen, it is no longer really possible to distinguish
357 computer programs from music performances, a word or two should be
358 said. At least we can have the satisfaction of indulging in an
359 argument <emphasis>ad pygmeam</emphasis>. When the econodwarf grows
360 rich, in my experience, he attends the opera. But no matter how often
361 he hears <emphasis>Don Giovanni</emphasis> it never occurs to him that
362 Mozart's fate should, on his logic, have entirely discouraged
363 Beethoven, or that we have <emphasis>The Magic Flute</emphasis> even
364 though Mozart knew very well he wouldn't be paid. In fact,
365 <emphasis>The Magic Flute</emphasis>, <emphasis>St. Matthew's
366 Passion</emphasis>, and the motets of the wife-murderer Carlo Gesualdo
367 are all part of the centuries-long tradition of free software, in the
368 more general sense, which the econodwarf never quite
369 acknowledges.</para> <!--<center><img
370 src="anarchism_files/mog1.gif"></center> --> <para> The dwarf's basic
371 problem is that "incentives" is merely a metaphor, and as a metaphor
372 to describe human creative activity it's pretty crummy. I have said
373 this before, <footnote> <para>10. <emphasis>See</emphasis> <ulink
374 url="http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/nospeech.html">The
375 Virtual Scholar and Network Liberation.</ulink></para> </footnote> but
376 the better metaphor arose on the day Michael Faraday first noticed
377 what happened when he wrapped a coil of wire around a magnet and spun
378 the magnet. Current flows in such a wire, but we don't ask what the
379 incentive is for the electrons to leave home. We say that the current
380 results from an emergent property of the system, which we call
381 induction. The question we ask is "what's the resistance of the wire?"
382 So Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to Faraday's Law says that if you
383 wrap the Internet around every person on the planet and spin the
384 planet, software flows in the network. It's an emergent property of
385 connected human minds that they create things for one another's
386 pleasure and to conquer their uneasy sense of being too alone. The
387 only question to ask is, what's the resistance of the network?
388 Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to Ohm's Law states that the
389 resistance of the network is directly proportional to the field
390 strength of the "intellectual property" system. So the right answer to
391 the econodwarf is, resist the resistance.</para>
392
393 <para>Естествено, всичко това звучи много добре на теория.
394 „Съпротивлявай се на съпротивата“ звучи добре, но ще се окажем
395 пред сериозен проблем, каквато и да е теорията, ако открием, че не
396 се произвежда достатъчно софтуерна стока, ако не позволяваме на
397 хората да я притежават. Но джуджетатат и дроидите са формалисти
398 от различно естество, предимството на реализма е, че ако започнеш
399 с фактитв, те винаги са на твоя страна. Оказва се, че да се
400 отнасяме към софтуера като съм собственост, води до правенето на
401 лош софтуер.</para>
402
403 </section>
404 <section>
405 <title>II. Software as Property: The Practical Problem</title>
406
407 <para>In order to understand why turning software into property
408 produces bad software, we need an introduction to the history of the
409 art. In fact, we'd better start with the word "art" itself. The
410 programming of computers combines determinate reasoning with literary
411 invention.</para>
412
413 <para>At first glance, to be sure, source code appears to be a
414 non-literary form of composition <footnote><para>11. Some basic
415 vocabulary is essential. Digital computers actually execute numerical
416 instructions: bitstrings that contain information in the "native"
417 language created by the machine's designers. This is usually referred
418 to as "machine language." The machine languages of hardware are
419 designed for speed of execution at the hardware level, and are not
420 suitable for direct use by human beings. So among the central
421 components of a computer system are "programming languages," which
422 translate expressions convenient for humans into machine language. The
423 most common and relevant, but by no means the only, form of computer
424 language is a "compiler." The compiler performs static translation, so
425 that a file containing human-readable instructions, known as "source
426 code" results in the generation of one or more files of executable
427 machine language, known as "object code."</para> </footnote>. The
428 primary desideratum in a computer program is that it works, that is to
429 say, performs according to specifications formally describing its
430 outputs in terms of its inputs. At this level of generality, the
431 functional content of programs is all that can be seen.</para>
432
433 <para>But working computer programs exist as parts of computer
434 systems, which are interacting collections of hardware, software, and
435 human beings. The human components of a computer system include not
436 only the users, but also the (potentially different) persons who
437 maintain and improve the system. Source code not only communicates
438 with the computer that executes the program, through the intermediary
439 of the compiler that produces machine-language object code, but also
440 with other programmers.</para>
441
442 <para>The function of source code in relation to other human beings is
443 not widely grasped by non-programmers, who tend to think of computer
444 programs as incomprehensible. They would be surprised to learn that
445 the bulk of information contained in most programs is, from the point
446 of view of the compiler or other language processor, "comment," that
447 is, non-functional material. The comments, of course, are addressed to
448 others who may need to fix a problem or to alter or enhance the
449 program's operation. In most programming languages, far more space is
450 spent in telling people what the program does than in telling the
451 computer how to do it.</para>
452
453 <para>The design of programming languages has always proceeded under
454 the dual requirements of complete specification for machine execution
455 and informative description for human readers. One might identify
456 three basic strategies in language design for approaching this dual
457 purpose. The first, pursued initially with respect to the design of
458 languages specific to particular hardware products and collectively
459 known as "assemblers," essentially separated the human- and
460 machine-communication portions of the program. Assembler instructions
461 are very close relatives of machine-language instructions: in general,
462 one line of an assembler program corresponds to one instruction in the
463 native language of the machine. The programmer controls machine
464 operation at the most specific possible level, and (if
465 well-disciplined) engages in running commentary alongside the machine
466 instructions, pausing every few hundred instructions to create "block
467 comments," which provide a summary of the strategy of the program, or
468 document the major data structures the program manipulates.</para>
469
470 <para>A second approach, characteristically depicted by the language
471 COBOL (which stood for "Common Business-Oriented Language"), was to
472 make the program itself look like a set of natural language
473 directions, written in a crabbed but theoretically human-readable
474 style. A line of COBOL code might say, for example "MULTIPLY PRICE
475 TIMES QUANTITY GIVING EXPANSION." At first, when the Pentagon and
476 industry experts began the joint design of COBOL in the early 1960's,
477 this seemed a promising approach. COBOL programs appeared largely
478 self-documenting, allowing both the development of work teams able to
479 collaborate on the creation of large programs, and the training of
480 programmers who, while specialized workers, would not need to
481 understand the machine as intimately as assembler programs had to. But
482 the level of generality at which such programs documented themselves
483 was wrongly selected. A more formulaic and compressed expression of
484 operational detail "expansion = price x quantity," for example, was
485 better suited even to business and financial applications where the
486 readers and writers of programs were accustomed to mathematical
487 expression, while the processes of describing both data structures and
488 the larger operational context of the program were not rendered
489 unnecessary by the wordiness of the language in which the details of
490 execution were specified.</para>
491
492 <para>Accordingly, language designers by the late 1960s began
493 experimenting with forms of expression in which the blending of
494 operational details and non-functional information necessary for
495 modification or repair was more subtle. Some designers chose the path
496 of highly symbolic and compressed languages, in which the programmer
497 manipulated data abstractly, so that "A x B" might mean the
498 multiplication of two integers, two complex numbers, two vast arrays,
499 or any other data type capable of some process called
500 "multiplication," to be undertaken by the computer on the basis of the
501 context for the variables "A" and "B" at the moment of execution
502 <footnote> <para>12. This, I should say, was the path that most of my
503 research and development followed, largely in connection with a
504 language called APL ("A Programming Language") and its successors. It
505 was not, however, the ultimately-dominant approach, for reasons that
506 will be suggested below.</para> </footnote> . Because this approach
507 resulted in extremely concise programs, it was thought, the problem of
508 making code comprehensible to those who would later seek to modify or
509 repair it was simplified. By hiding the technical detail of computer
510 operation and emphasizing the algorithm, languages could be devised
511 that were better than English or other natural languages for the
512 expression of stepwise processes. Commentary would be not only
513 unnecessary but distracting, just as the metaphors used to convey
514 mathematical concepts in English do more to confuse than to
515 enlighten.</para>
516
517 <section>
518 <title>How We Created the Microbrain Mess</title>
519
520 <para>Thus the history of programming languages directly reflected the
521 need to find forms of human-machine communication that were also
522 effective in conveying complex ideas to human readers. "Expressivity"
523 became a property of programming languages, not because it facilitated
524 computation, but because it facilitated the collaborative creation and
525 maintenance of increasingly complex software systems.</para>
526
527 <para>At first impression, this seems to justify the application of
528 traditional copyright thinking to the resulting works. Though
529 substantially involving "functional" elements, computer programs
530 contained "expressive" features of paramount importance. Copyright
531 doctrine recognized the merger of function and expression as
532 characteristic of many kinds of copyrighted works. "Source code,"
533 containing both the machine instructions necessary for functional
534 operation and the expressive "commentary" intended for human readers,
535 was an appropriate candidate for copyright treatment.</para>
536
537 <para>True, so long as it is understood that the expressive component
538 of software was present solely in order to facilitate the making of
539 "derivative works." Were it not for the intention to facilitate
540 alteration, the expressive elements of programs would be entirely
541 supererogatory, and source code would be no more copyrightable than
542 object code, the output of the language processor, purged of all but
543 the program's functional characteristics.</para>
544
545 <para>The state of the computer industry throughout the 1960's and
546 1970's, when the grundnorms of sophisticated computer programming were
547 established, concealed the tension implicit in this situation. In that
548 period, hardware was expensive. Computers were increasingly large and
549 complex collections of machines, and the business of designing and
550 building such an array of machines for general use was dominated, not
551 to say monopolized, by one firm. IBM gave away its software. To be
552 sure, it owned the programs its employees wrote, and it copyrighted
553 the source code. But it also distributed the programs - including the
554 source code - to its customers at no additional charge, and encouraged
555 them to make and share improvements or adaptations of the programs
556 thus distributed. For a dominant hardware manufacturer, this strategy
557 made sense: better programs sold more computers, which is where the
558 profitability of the business rested.</para>
559
560 <para>Computers, in this period, tended to aggregate within particular
561 organizations, but not to communicate broadly with one another. The
562 software needed to operate was distributed not through a network, but
563 on spools of magnetic tape. This distribution system tended to
564 centralize software development, so that while IBM customers were free
565 to make modifications and improvements to programs, those
566 modifications were shared in the first instance with IBM, which then
567 considered whether and in what way to incorporate those changes in the
568 centrally-developed and distributed version of the software. Thus in
569 two important senses the best computer software in the world was free:
570 it cost nothing to acquire, and the terms on which it was furnished
571 both allowed and encouraged experimentation, change, and improvement
572 <footnote><para>13. This description elides some details. By the
573 mid-1970's IBM had acquired meaningful competition in the mainframe
574 computer business, while the large-scale antitrust action brought
575 against it by the U.S. government prompted the decision to "unbundle,"
576 or charge separately, for software. In this less important sense,
577 software ceased to be free. But - without entering into the now-dead
578 but once-heated controversy over IBM's software pricing policies - the
579 unbundling revolution had less effect on the social practices of
580 software manufacture than might be supposed. As a fellow responsible
581 for technical improvement of one programming language product at IBM
582 from 1979 to 1984, for example, I was able to treat the product as
583 "almost free," that is, to discuss with users the changes they had
584 proposed or made in the programs, and to engage with them in
585 cooperative development of the product for the benefit of all
586 users.</para> </footnote>. That the software in question was IBM's
587 property under prevailing copyright law certainly established some
588 theoretical limits on users' ability to distribute their improvements
589 or adaptations to others, but in practice mainframe software was
590 cooperatively developed by the dominant hardware manufacturer and its
591 technically-sophisticated users, employing the manufacturer's
592 distribution resources to propagate the resulting improvements through
593 the user community. The right to exclude others, one of the most
594 important "sticks in the bundle" of property rights (in an image
595 beloved of the United States Supreme Court), was practically
596 unimportant, or even undesirable, at the heart of the software
597 business <footnote> <para>14. This description is highly compressed,
598 and will seem both overly simplified and unduly rosy to those who also
599 worked in the industry during this period of its
600 development. Copyright protection of computer software was a
601 controversial subject in the 1970's, leading to the famous CONTU
602 commission and its mildly pro-copyright recommendations of 1979. And
603 IBM seemed far less cooperative to its users at the time than this
604 sketch makes out. But the most important element is the contrast with
605 the world created by the PC, the Internet, and the dominance of
606 Microsoft, with the resulting impetus for the free software movement,
607 and I am here concentrating on the features that express that
608 contrast.</para></footnote>.</para>
609
610 <para>After 1980, everything was different. The world of mainframe
611 hardware gave way within ten years to the world of the commodity PC.
612 And, as a contingency of the industry's development, the single most
613 important element of the software running on that commodity PC, the
614 operating system, became the sole significant product of a company
615 that made no hardware. High-quality basic software ceased to be part
616 of the product-differentiation strategy of hardware
617 manufacturers. Instead, a firm with an overwhelming share of the
618 market, and with the near-monopolist's ordinary absence of interest in
619 fostering diversity, set the practices of the software industry. In
620 such a context, the right to exclude others from participation in the
621 product's formation became profoundly important. Microsoft's power in
622 the market rested entirely on its ownership of the Windows source
623 code.</para>
624
625 <para>To Microsoft, others' making of "derivative works," otherwise
626 known as repairs and improvements, threatened the central asset of the
627 business. Indeed, as subsequent judicial proceedings have tended to
628 establish, Microsoft's strategy as a business was to find innovative
629 ideas elsewhere in the software marketplace, buy them up and either
630 suppress them or incorporate them in its proprietary product. The
631 maintenance of control over the basic operation of computers
632 manufactured, sold, possessed, and used by others represented profound
633 and profitable leverage over the development of the culture <footnote>
634 <para>15. I discuss the importance of PC software in this context, the
635 evolution of "the market for eyeballs" and "the sponsored life" in
636 other chapters of my forthcoming book, <emphasis>The Invisible
637 Barbecue</emphasis>, of which this essay forms a part.</para>
638 </footnote>.; the right to exclude returned to center stage in the
639 concept of software as property.</para>
640
641 <para>The result, so far as the quality of software was concerned, was
642 disastrous. The monopoly was a wealthy and powerful corporation that
643 employed a large number of programmers, but it could not possibly
644 afford the number of testers, designers, and developers required to
645 produce flexible, robust and technically-innovative software
646 appropriate to the vast array of conditions under which increasingly
647 ubiquitous personal computers operated. Its fundamental marketing
648 strategy involved designing its product for the least
649 technically-sophisticated users, and using "fear, uncertainty, and
650 doubt" (known within Microsoft as "FUD") to drive sophisticated users
651 away from potential competitors, whose long-term survivability in the
652 face of Microsoft's market power was always in question.</para>
653
654 <para>Without the constant interaction between users able to repair
655 and improve and the operating system's manufacturer, the inevitable
656 deterioration of quality could not be arrested. But because the
657 personal computer revolution expanded the number of users
658 exponentially, almost everyone who came in contact with the resulting
659 systems had nothing against which to compare them. Unaware of the
660 standards of stability, reliability, maintainability and effectiveness
661 that had previously been established in the mainframe world, users of
662 personal computers could hardly be expected to understand how badly,
663 in relative terms, the monopoly's software functioned. As the power
664 and capacity of personal computers expanded rapidly, the defects of
665 the software were rendered less obvious amidst the general increase of
666 productivity. Ordinary users, more than half afraid of the technology
667 they almost completely did not understand, actually welcomed the
668 defectiveness of the software. In an economy undergoing mysterious
669 transformations, with the concomitant destabilization of millions of
670 careers, it was tranquilizing, in a perverse way, that no personal
671 computer seemed to be able to run for more than a few consecutive
672 hours without crashing. Although it was frustrating to lose work in
673 progress each time an unnecessary failure occurred, the evident
674 fallibility of computers was intrinsically reassuring <footnote>
675 <para>16. This same pattern of ambivalence, in which bad programming
676 leading to widespread instability in the new technology is
677 simultaneously frightening and reassuring to technical incompetents,
678 can be seen also in the primarily-American phenomenon of Y2K
679 hysteria.</para> </footnote> .</para>
680
681 <para>None of this was necessary. The low quality of personal computer
682 software could have been reversed by including users directly in the
683 inherently evolutionary process of software design and implementation.
684 A Lamarckian mode, in which improvements could be made anywhere, by
685 anyone, and inherited by everyone else, would have wiped out the
686 deficit, restoring to the world of the PC the stability and
687 reliability of the software made in the quasi-propertarian environment
688 of the mainframe era. But the Microsoft business model precluded
689 Lamarckian inheritance of software improvements. Copyright doctrine,
690 in general and as it applies to software in particular, biases the
691 world towards creationism; in this instance, the problem is that BillG
692 the Creator was far from infallible, and in fact he wasn't even
693 trying.</para> <!--<center><img src="anarchism_files/mog2.gif"
694 hspace="0" vspace="0"></center>--> <para>To make the irony more
695 severe, the growth of the network rendered the non-propertarian
696 alternative even more practical. What scholarly and popular writing
697 alike denominate as a thing ("the Internet") is actually the name of a
698 social condition: the fact that everyone in the network society is
699 connected directly, without intermediation, to everyone else
700 <footnote> <para>17. The critical implications of this simple
701 observation about our metaphors are worked out in "How Not to Think
702 about 'The Internet'," in <emphasis>The Invisible Barbecue</emphasis>,
703 forthcoming.</para> </footnote>. The global interconnection of
704 networks eliminated the bottleneck that had required a centralized
705 software manufacturer to rationalize and distribute the outcome of
706 individual innovation in the era of the mainframe.</para>
707
708 <para>And so, in one of history's little ironies, the global triumph
709 of bad software in the age of the PC was reversed by a surprising
710 combination of forces: the social transformation initiated by the
711 network, a long-discarded European theory of political economy, and a
712 small band of programmers throughout the world mobilized by a single
713 simple idea.</para>
714
715 </section>
716 <section>
717
718 <title>Software Wants to Be Free; or, How We Stopped Worrying and
719 Learned to Love the Bomb</title>
720
721 <para>Long before the network of networks was a practical reality,
722 even before it was an aspiration, there was a desire for computers to
723 operate on the basis of software freely available to everyone. This
724 began as a reaction against propertarian software in the mainframe
725 era, and requires another brief historical digression.</para>
726
727 <para>Even though IBM was the largest seller of general purpose
728 computers in the mainframe era, it was not the largest designer and
729 builder of such hardware. The telephone monopoly, American Telephone
730 &amp; Telegraph, was in fact larger than IBM, but it consumed its
731 products internally. And at the famous Bell Labs research arm of the
732 telephone monopoly, in the late 1960's, the developments in computer
733 languages previously described gave birth to an operating system
734 called Unix.</para>
735
736 <para>The idea of Unix was to create a single, scalable operating
737 system to exist on all the computers, from small to large, that the
738 telephone monopoly made for itself. To achieve this goal meant writing
739 an operating system not in machine language, nor in an assembler whose
740 linguistic form was integral to a particular hardware design, but in a
741 more expressive and generalized language. The one chosen was also a
742 Bell Labs invention, called "C" <footnote> <para>18. Technical readers
743 will again observe that this compresses developments occurring from
744 1969 through 1973.</para> </footnote>. The C language became common,
745 even dominant, for many kinds of programming tasks, and by the late
746 1970's the Unix operating system written in that language had been
747 transferred (or "ported," in professional jargon) to computers made by
748 many manufacturers and of many designs.</para>
749
750 <para>AT&amp;T distributed Unix widely, and because of the very design
751 of the operating system, it had to make that distribution in C source
752 code. But AT&amp;T retained ownership of the source code and
753 compelled users to purchase licenses that prohibited redistribution
754 and the making of derivative works. Large computing centers, whether
755 industrial or academic, could afford to purchase such licenses, but
756 individuals could not, while the license restrictions prevented the
757 community of programmers who used Unix from improving it in an
758 evolutionary rather than episodic fashion. And as programmers
759 throughout the world began to aspire to and even expect a personal
760 computer revolution, the "unfree" status of Unix became a source of
761 concern.</para>
762
763 <para>Between 1981 and 1984, one man envisioned a crusade to change
764 the situation. Richard M. Stallman, then an employee of MIT's
765 Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, conceived the project of
766 independent, collaborative redesign and implementation of an operating
767 system that would be true free software. In Stallman's phrase, free
768 software would be a matter of freedom, not of price. Anyone could
769 freely modify and redistribute such software, or sell it, subject only
770 to the restriction that he not try to reduce the rights of others to
771 whom he passed it along. In this way free software could become a
772 self-organizing project, in which no innovation would be lost through
773 proprietary exercises of rights. The system, Stallman decided, would
774 be called GNU, which stood (in an initial example of a taste for
775 recursive acronyms that has characterized free software ever since),
776 for "GNU's Not Unix." Despite misgivings about the fundamental design
777 of Unix, as well as its terms of distribution, GNU was intended to
778 benefit from the wide if unfree source distribution of Unix. Stallman
779 began Project GNU by writing components of the eventual system that
780 were also designed to work without modification on existing Unix
781 systems. Development of the GNU tools could thus proceed directly in
782 the environment of university and other advanced computing centers
783 around the world.</para>
784
785 <para>The scale of such a project was immense. Somehow, volunteer
786 programmers had to be found, organized, and set to work building all
787 the tools that would be necessary for the ultimate construction.
788 Stallman himself was the primary author of several fundamental tools.
789 Others were contributed by small or large teams of programmers
790 elsewhere, and assigned to Stallman's project or distributed
791 directly. A few locations around the developing network became
792 archives for the source code of these GNU components, and throughout
793 the 1980's the GNU tools gained recognition and acceptance by Unix
794 users throughout the world. The stability, reliability, and
795 maintainability of the GNU tools became a by-word, while Stallman's
796 profound abilities as a designer continued to outpace, and provide
797 goals for, the evolving process. The award to Stallman of a MacArthur
798 Fellowship in 1990 was an appropriate recognition of his conceptual
799 and technical innovations and their social consequences.</para>
800
801 <para>Project GNU, and the Free Software Foundation to which it gave
802 birth in 1985, were not the only source of free software
803 ideas. Several forms of copyright license designed to foster free or
804 partially free software began to develop in the academic community,
805 mostly around the Unix environment. The University of California at
806 Berkeley began the design and implementation of another version of
807 Unix for free distribution in the academic community. BSD Unix, as it
808 came to be known, also treated AT&amp;T's Unix as a design
809 standard. The code was broadly released and constituted a reservoir of
810 tools and techniques, but its license terms limited the range of its
811 application, while the elimination of hardware-specific proprietary
812 code from the distribution meant that no one could actually build a
813 working operating system for any particular computer from BSD. Other
814 university-based work also eventuated in quasi-free software; the
815 graphical user interface (or GUI) for Unix systems called X Windows,
816 for example, was created at MIT and distributed with source code on
817 terms permitting free modification. And in 1989-1990, an undergraduate
818 computer science student at the University of Helsinki, Linus
819 Torvalds, began the project that completed the circuit and fully
820 energized the free software vision.</para>
821
822 <para>What Torvalds did was to begin adapting a computer science
823 teaching tool for real life use. Andrew Tannenbaum's MINIX kernel
824 <footnote> <para>19. Operating systems, even Windows (which hides the
825 fact from its users as thoroughly as possible), are actually
826 collections of components, rather than undivided unities. Most of what
827 an operating system does (manage file systems, control process
828 execution, etc.) can be abstracted from the actual details of the
829 computer hardware on which the operating system runs. Only a small
830 inner core of the system must actually deal with the eccentric
831 peculiarities of particular hardware. Once the operating system is
832 written in a general language such as C, only that inner core, known
833 in the trade as the kernel, will be highly specific to a particular
834 computer architecture.</para> </footnote> , was a staple of Operating
835 Systems courses, providing an example of basic solutions to basic
836 problems. Slowly, and at first without recognizing the intention,
837 Linus began turning the MINIX kernel into an actual kernel for Unix on
838 the Intel x86 processors, the engines that run the world's commodity
839 PCs. As Linus began developing this kernel, which he named Linux, he
840 realized that the best way to make his project work would be to adjust
841 his design decisions so that the existing GNU components would be
842 compatible with his kernel.</para>
843
844 <para>The result of Torvalds' work was the release on the net in 1991
845 of a sketchy working model of a free software kernel for a Unix-like
846 operating system for PCs, fully compatible with and designed
847 convergently with the large and high-quality suite of system
848 components created by Stallman's Project GNU and distributed by the
849 Free Software Foundation. Because Torvalds chose to release the Linux
850 kernel under the Free Software Foundation's General Public License, of
851 which more below, the hundreds and eventually thousands of programmers
852 around the world who chose to contribute their effort towards the
853 further development of the kernel could be sure that their efforts
854 would result in permanently free software that no one could turn into
855 a proprietary product. Everyone knew that everyone else would be able
856 to test, improve, and redistribute their improvements. Torvalds
857 accepted contributions freely, and with a genially effective style
858 maintained overall direction without dampening enthusiasm. The
859 development of the Linux kernel proved that the Internet made it
860 possible to aggregate collections of programmers far larger than any
861 commercial manufacturer could afford, joined almost non-hierarchically
862 in a development project ultimately involving more than one million
863 lines of computer code - a scale of collaboration among geographically
864 dispersed unpaid volunteers previously unimaginable in human history
865 <footnote> <para>20. A careful and creative analysis of how Torvalds
866 made this process work, and what it implies for the social practices
867 of creating software, was provided by Eric S. Raymond in his seminal
868 1997 paper, <ulink
869 url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue3_3/raymond/index.html">The
870 Cathedral and the Bazaar,</ulink> which itself played a significant
871 role in the expansion of the free software idea.</para>
872 </footnote>.</para>
873
874 <para>By 1994, Linux had reached version 1.0, representing a usable
875 production kernel. Level 2.0 was reached in 1996, and by 1998, with
876 the kernel at 2.2.0 and available not only for x86 machines but for a
877 variety of other machine architectures, GNU/Linux - the combination of
878 the Linux kernel and the much larger body of Project GNU components -
879 and Windows NT were the only two operating systems in the world
880 gaining market share. A Microsoft internal assessment of the situation
881 leaked in October 1998 and subsequently acknowledged by the company as
882 genuine concluded that "Linux represents a best-of-breed UNIX, that is
883 trusted in mission critical applications, and - due to it's [sic] open
884 source code - has a long term credibility which exceeds many other
885 competitive OS's." <footnote> <para>21. This is a quotation from what
886 is known in the trade as the "Halloween memo," which can be found, as
887 annotated by Eric Raymond, to whom it was leaked, at <ulink
888 url="http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween1.html">
889 http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween1.html</ulink>.</para></footnote>
890 GNU/Linux systems are now used throughout the world, operating
891 everything from Web servers at major electronic commerce sites to
892 "ad-hoc supercomputer" clusters to the network infrastructure of
893 money-center banks. GNU/Linux is found on the space shuttle, and
894 running behind-the-scenes computers at (yes) Microsoft. Industry
895 evaluations of the comparative reliability of Unix systems have
896 repeatedly shown that Linux is far and away the most stable and
897 reliable Unix kernel, with a reliability exceeded only by the GNU
898 tools themselves. GNU/Linux not only out-performs commercial
899 proprietary Unix versions for PCs in benchmarks, but is renowned for
900 its ability to run, undisturbed and uncomplaining, for months on end
901 in high-volume high-stress environments without crashing.</para>
902
903 <para>Other components of the free software movement have been equally
904 successful. Apache, far and away the world's leading Web server
905 program, is free software, as is Perl, the programming language which
906 is the lingua franca for the programmers who build sophisticated Web
907 sites. Netscape Communications now distributes its Netscape
908 Communicator 5.0 browser as free software, under a close variant of
909 the Free Software Foundation's General Public License. Major PC
910 manufacturers, including IBM, have announced plans or are already
911 distributing GNU/Linux as a customer option on their top-of-the-line
912 PCs intended for use as Web- and file servers. Samba, a program that
913 allows GNU/Linux computers to act as Windows NT file servers, is used
914 worldwide as an alternative to Windows NT Server, and provides
915 effective low-end competition to Microsoft in its own home market. By
916 the standards of software quality that have been recognized in the
917 industry for decades - and whose continuing relevance will be clear to
918 you the next time your Windows PC crashes - the news at century's end
919 is unambiguous. The world's most profitable and powerful corporation
920 comes in a distant second, having excluded all but the real victor
921 from the race. Propertarianism joined to capitalist vigor destroyed
922 meaningful commercial competition, but when it came to making good
923 software, anarchism won.</para>
924
925
926 </section>
927 </section>
928 <!--<para><img src="anarchism_files/quad.gif"></para><a name="m3"></a>-->
929 <section>
930 <title>III. Anarchism as a Mode of Production</title>
931
932 <para>It's a pretty story, and if only the IPdroid and the econodwarf
933 hadn't been blinded by theory, they'd have seen it coming. But though
934 some of us had been working for it and predicting it for years, the
935 theoretical consequences are so subversive for the thoughtways that
936 maintain our dwarves and droids in comfort that they can hardly be
937 blamed for refusing to see. The facts proved that something was wrong
938 with the "incentives" metaphor that underprops conventional
939 intellectual property reasoning <footnote> <para>22. As recently as
940 early 1994 a talented and technically competent (though Windows-using)
941 law and economics scholar at a major U.S. law school confidently
942 informed me that free software couldn't possibly exist, because no one
943 would have any incentive to make really sophisticated programs
944 requiring substantial investment of effort only to give them
945 away.</para> </footnote> . But they did more. They provided an initial
946 glimpse into the future of human creativity in a world of global
947 interconnection, and it's not a world made for dwarves and
948 droids.</para>
949
950 <para>My argument, before we paused for refreshment in the real world,
951 can be summarized this way: Software - whether executable programs,
952 music, visual art, liturgy, weaponry, or what have you - consists of
953 bitstreams, which although essentially indistinguishable are treated
954 by a confusing multiplicity of legal categories. This multiplicity is
955 unstable in the long term for reasons integral to the legal process.
956 The unstable diversity of rules is caused by the need to distinguish
957 among kinds of property interests in bitstreams. This need is
958 primarily felt by those who stand to profit from the socially
959 acceptable forms of monopoly created by treating ideas as
960 property. Those of us who are worried about the social inequity and
961 cultural hegemony created by this intellectually unsatisfying and
962 morally repugnant regime are shouted down. Those doing the shouting,
963 the dwarves and the droids, believe that these property rules are
964 necessary not from any overt yearning for life in Murdochworld -
965 though a little luxurious co-optation is always welcome - but because
966 the metaphor of incentives, which they take to be not just an image
967 but an argument, proves that these rules - despite their lamentable
968 consequences - are necessary if we are to make good software. The only
969 way to continue to believe this is to ignore the facts. At the center
970 of the digital revolution, with the executable bitstreams that make
971 everything else possible, propertarian regimes not only do not make
972 things better, they can make things radically worse. Property
973 concepts, whatever else may be wrong with them, do not enable and have
974 in fact retarded progress.</para>
975
976 <para>
977 But what is this mysterious alternative? Free software exists, but
978 what are its mechanisms, and how does it generalize towards a
979 non-propertarian theory of the digital society?</para>
980
981 </section>
982 <section>
983
984 <title>The Legal Theory of Free Software</title>
985
986 <para>There is a myth, like most myths partially founded on reality,
987 that computer programmers are all libertarians. Right-wing ones are
988 capitalists, cleave to their stock options, and disdain taxes, unions,
989 and civil rights laws; left-wing ones hate the market and all
990 government, believe in strong encryption no matter how much nuclear
991 terrorism it may cause, <footnote> <para>23. This question too
992 deserves special scrutiny, encrusted as it is with special pleading on
993 the state-power side. See my brief essay <ulink
994 url="http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/yu-encrypt.html">"<emphasis>So
995 Much for Savages</emphasis>: Navajo 1, Government 0 in Final Moments of
996 Play."</ulink></para> </footnote> and dislike Bill Gates because he's
997 rich. There is doubtless a foundation for this belief. But the most
998 significant difference between political thought inside the digirati
999 and outside it is that in the network society, anarchism (or more
1000 properly, anti-possessive individualism) is a viable political
1001 philosophy.</para>
1002
1003 <para>The center of the free software movement's success, and the
1004 greatest achievement of Richard Stallman, is not a piece of computer
1005 code. The success of free software, including the overwhelming success
1006 of GNU/Linux, results from the ability to harness extraordinary
1007 quantities of high-quality effort for projects of immense size and
1008 profound complexity. And this ability in turn results from the legal
1009 context in which the labor is mobilized. As a visionary designer
1010 Richard Stallman created more than Emacs, GDB, or GNU. He created the
1011 General Public License.</para>
1012
1013 <!-- <center><img src="anarchism_files/mog3.gif" hspace="0"
1014 vspace="0"></center> --> <para>The GPL, <footnote>
1015 <para>24. <emphasis>See</emphasis> <ulink
1016 url="http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt">GNU General Public License,
1017 Version 2, June 1991.</ulink></para> </footnote> also known as the
1018 copyleft, uses copyright, to paraphrase Toby Milsom, to counterfeit
1019 the phenomena of anarchism. As the license preamble expresses
1020 it:</para>
1021
1022 <blockquote><para>When we speak of free software, we are referring to
1023 freedom, not price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make
1024 sure that you have the freedom to distribute copies of free software
1025 (and charge for this service if you wish), that you receive source
1026 code or can get it if you want it, that you can change the software or
1027 use pieces of it in new free programs; and that you know you can do
1028 these things.</para>
1029
1030 <para>To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that
1031 forbid anyone to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender the
1032 rights. These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for
1033 you if you distribute copies of the software, or if you modify
1034 it.</para>
1035
1036 <para>For example, if you distribute copies of such a program,
1037 whether gratis or for a fee, you must give the recipients all the
1038 rights that you have. You must make sure that they, too, receive or
1039 can get the source code. And you must show them these terms so they
1040 know their rights.</para>
1041
1042 <para>Many variants of this basic free software idea have been
1043 expressed in licenses of various kinds, as I have already
1044 indicated. The GPL is different from the other ways of expressing
1045 these values in one crucial respect. Section 2 of the license provides
1046 in pertinent part:</para>
1047
1048 <para>You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or any
1049 portion of it, thus forming a work based on the Program, and copy and
1050 distribute such modifications or work ..., provided that you also meet
1051 all of these conditions: </para>
1052
1053 <para>...</para>
1054
1055 <para>b) You must cause any work that you distribute or publish,
1056 that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or
1057 any part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third
1058 parties under the terms of this License.</para></blockquote>
1059
1060 <para>Section 2(b) of the GPL is sometimes called "restrictive," but
1061 its intention is liberating. It creates a commons, to which anyone may
1062 add but from which no one may subtract. Because of §2(b), each
1063 contributor to a GPL'd project is assured that she, and all other
1064 users, will be able to run, modify and redistribute the program
1065 indefinitely, that source code will always be available, and that,
1066 unlike commercial software, its longevity cannot be limited by the
1067 contingencies of the marketplace or the decisions of future
1068 developers. This "inheritance" of the GPL has sometimes been
1069 criticized as an example of the free software movement's
1070 anti-commercial bias. Nothing could be further from the truth. The
1071 effect of §2(b) is to make commercial distributors of free software
1072 better competitors against proprietary software businesses. For
1073 confirmation of this point, one can do no better than to ask the
1074 proprietary competitors. As the author of the Microsoft "Halloween"
1075 memorandum, Vinod Vallopillil, put it:</para>
1076
1077 <blockquote><para>The GPL and its aversion to code forking reassures
1078 customers that they aren't riding an evolutionary `dead-end' by
1079 subscribing to a particular commercial version of Linux.</para>
1080
1081 <para>The "evolutionary dead-end" is the core of the software
1082 FUD argument <footnote> <para>25. <ulink
1083 url="http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween1.html">V. Vallopillil,
1084 Open Source Software: A (New?) Development Methodology.</ulink></para>
1085 </footnote> .</para></blockquote>
1086
1087 <para>Translated out of Microspeak, this means that the strategy by
1088 which the dominant proprietary manufacturer drives customers away from
1089 competitors - by sowing fear, uncertainty and doubt about other
1090 software's long-term viability - is ineffective with respect to GPL'd
1091 programs. Users of GPL'd code, including those who purchase software
1092 and systems from a commercial reseller, know that future improvements
1093 and repairs will be accessible from the commons, and need not fear
1094 either the disappearance of their supplier or that someone will use a
1095 particularly attractive improvement or a desperately necessary repair
1096 as leverage for "taking the program private."</para>
1097
1098 <para>This use of intellectual property rules to create a commons in
1099 cyberspace is the central institutional structure enabling the
1100 anarchist triumph. Ensuring free access and enabling modification at
1101 each stage in the process means that the evolution of software occurs
1102 in the fast Lamarckian mode: each favorable acquired characteristic of
1103 others' work can be directly inherited. Hence the speed with which the
1104 Linux kernel, for example, outgrew all of its proprietary
1105 predecessors. Because defection is impossible, free riders are
1106 welcome, which resolves one of the central puzzles of collective
1107 action in a propertarian social system.</para>
1108
1109 <para>Non-propertarian production is also directly responsible for the
1110 famous stability and reliability of free software, which arises from
1111 what Eric Raymond calls "Linus' law": With enough eyeballs, all bugs
1112 are shallow. In practical terms, access to source code means that if I
1113 have a problem I can fix it. Because I can fix it, I almost never have
1114 to, because someone else has almost always seen it and fixed it
1115 first.</para>
1116
1117 <para>For the free software community, commitment to anarchist
1118 production may be a moral imperative; as Richard Stallman wrote, it's
1119 about freedom, not about price. Or it may be a matter of utility,
1120 seeking to produce better software than propertarian modes of work
1121 will allow. From the droid point of view, the copyleft represents the
1122 perversion of theory, but better than any other proposal over the past
1123 decades it resolves the problems of applying copyright to the
1124 inextricably merged functional and expressive features of computer
1125 programs. That it produces better software than the alternative does
1126 not imply that traditional copyright principles should now be
1127 prohibited to those who want to own and market inferior software
1128 products, or (more charitably) whose products are too narrow in appeal
1129 for communal production. But our story should serve as a warning to
1130 droids: The world of the future will bear little relation to the world
1131 of the past. The rules are now being bent in two directions. The
1132 corporate owners of "cultural icons" and other assets who seek
1133 ever-longer terms for corporate authors, converting the "limited Time"
1134 of Article I, §8 into a freehold have naturally been whistling music
1135 to the android ear <footnote> <para>26. The looming expiration of
1136 Mickey Mouse's ownership by Disney requires, from the point of view of
1137 that wealthy "campaign contributor," for example, an alteration of the
1138 general copyright law of the United States. See "Not Making it Any
1139 More? Vaporizing the Public Domain," in <emphasis>The Invisible
1140 Barbecue</emphasis>, forthcoming.</para> </footnote> . After all, who bought
1141 the droids their concert tickets? But as the propertarian position
1142 seeks to embed itself ever more strongly, in a conception of copyright
1143 liberated from the minor annoyances of limited terms and fair use, at
1144 the very center of our "cultural software" system, the anarchist
1145 counter-strike has begun. Worse is yet to befall the droids, as we
1146 shall see. But first, we must pay our final devoirs to the
1147 dwarves.</para>
1148
1149 </section>
1150 <section>
1151 <title>Because It's There: Faraday's Magnet and Human Creativity</title>
1152
1153 <para>After all, they deserve an answer. Why do people make free
1154 software if they don't get to profit? Two answers have usually been
1155 given. One is half-right and the other is wrong, but both are
1156 insufficiently simple.</para>
1157
1158 <para>The wrong answer is embedded in numerous references to "the
1159 hacker gift-exchange culture." This use of ethnographic jargon
1160 wandered into the field some years ago and became rapidly, if
1161 misleadingly, ubiquitous. It reminds us only that the
1162 economeretricians have so corrupted our thought processes that any
1163 form of non-market economic behavior seems equal to every other
1164 kind. But gift-exchange, like market barter, is a propertarian
1165 institution. Reciprocity is central to these symbolic enactments of
1166 mutual dependence, and if either the yams or the fish are
1167 short-weighted, trouble results. Free software, at the risk of
1168 repetition, is a commons: no reciprocity ritual is enacted there. A
1169 few people give away code that others sell, use, change, or borrow
1170 wholesale to lift out parts for something else. Notwithstanding the
1171 very large number of people (tens of thousands, at most) who have
1172 contributed to GNU/Linux, this is orders of magnitude less than the
1173 number of users who make no contribution whatever <footnote>
1174 <para>27. A recent industry estimate puts the number of Linux systems
1175 worldwide at 7.5 million. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Josh McHugh, 1998. <ulink
1176 url="http://www.forbes.com/forbes/98/0810/6203094s1.htm">"Linux: The
1177 Making of a Global Hack,"</ulink> <emphasis>Forbes</emphasis> (August 10). Because the
1178 software is freely obtainable throughout the Net, there is no simple
1179 way to assess actual usage.</para> </footnote>.</para>
1180
1181 <para>A part of the right answer is suggested by the claim that free
1182 software is made by those who seek reputational compensation for their
1183 activity. Famous Linux hackers, the theory is, are known all over the
1184 planet as programming deities. From this they derive either enhanced
1185 self-esteem or indirect material advancement <footnote> <para>28. Eric
1186 Raymond is a partisan of the "ego boost" theory, to which he adds
1187 another faux-ethnographic comparison, of free software composition to
1188 the Kwakiutl potlatch. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Eric S. Raymond, 1998. <ulink
1189 url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue3_10/raymond/index.html">Homesteading
1190 the Noosphere.</ulink>. But the potlatch, certainly a form of status
1191 competition, is unlike free software for two fundamental reasons: it
1192 is essentially hierarchical, which free software is not, and, as we
1193 have known since Thorstein Veblen first called attention to its
1194 significance, it is a form of conspicuous waste. <emphasis>See</emphasis> Thorstein
1195 Veblen, 1967. <emphasis>The Theory of the Leisure Class.</emphasis> New York:
1196 Viking, p. 75. These are precisely the grounds which distinguish the
1197 anti-hierarchical and utilitiarian free software culture from its
1198 propertarian counterparts.</para></footnote>. But the programming
1199 deities, much as they have contributed to free software, have not done
1200 the bulk of the work. Reputations, as Linus Torvalds himself has often
1201 pointed out, are made by willingly acknowledging that it was all done
1202 by someone else. And, as many observers have noted, the free software
1203 movement has also produced superlative
1204 documentation. Documentation-writing is not what hackers do to attain
1205 cool, and much of the documentation has been written by people who
1206 didn't write the code. Nor must we limit the indirect material
1207 advantages of authorship to increases in reputational capital. Most
1208 free software authors I know have day jobs in the technology
1209 industries, and the skills they hone in the more creative work they do
1210 outside the market no doubt sometimes measurably enhance their value
1211 within it. And as the free software products gained critical mass and
1212 became the basis of a whole new set of business models built around
1213 commercial distribution of that which people can also get for nothing,
1214 an increasing number of people are specifically employed to write free
1215 software. But in order to be employable in the field, they must
1216 already have established themselves there. Plainly, then, this motive
1217 is present, but it isn't the whole explanation.</para>
1218
1219 <para>Indeed, the rest of the answer is just too simple to have
1220 received its due. The best way to understand is to follow the brief
1221 and otherwise unsung career of an initially-grudging free software
1222 author. Microsoft's Vinod Vallopillil, in the course of writing the
1223 competitive analysis of Linux that was leaked as the second of the
1224 famous "Halloween memoranda," bought and installed a Linux system on
1225 one of his office computers. He had trouble because the (commercial)
1226 Linux distribution he installed did not contain a daemon to handle the
1227 DHCP protocol for assignment of dynamic IP addresses. The result was
1228 important enough for us to risk another prolonged exposure to the
1229 Microsoft Writing Style:</para>
1230
1231 <blockquote><para>A small number of Web sites and FAQs later, I found an FTP
1232 site with a Linux DHCP client. The DHCP client was developed by an
1233 engineer employed by Fore Systems (as evidenced by his e-mail address;
1234 I believe, however, that it was developed in his own free time). A
1235 second set of documentation/manuals was written for the DHCP client by
1236 a hacker in <emphasis>Hungary</emphasis> which provided relatively simple
1237 instructions on how to install/load the client.</para>
1238
1239 <para>I downloaded &amp; uncompressed the client and typed two
1240 simple commands:</para>
1241
1242 <para>Make - compiles the client binaries</para>
1243
1244 <para>Make Install -installed the binaries as a Linux Daemon</para>
1245
1246 <para>Typing "DHCPCD" (for DHCP Client Daemon) on the command
1247 line triggered the DHCP discovery process and voila, I had IP
1248 networking running. </para>
1249
1250 <para>Since I had just downloaded the DHCP client code, on an
1251 impulse I played around a bit. Although the client wasn't as
1252 extensible as the DHCP client we are shipping in NT5 (for example, it
1253 won't query for arbitrary options &amp; store results), it was obvious
1254 how I could write the additional code to implement this functionality.
1255 The full client consisted of about 2,600 lines of code.</para>
1256
1257 <para>One example of esoteric, extended functionality that was
1258 clearly patched in by a third party was a set of routines to that
1259 would pad the DHCP request with host-specific strings required by
1260 Cable Modem / ADSL sites.</para>
1261
1262 <para>A few other steps were required to configure the DHCP
1263 client to auto-start and auto-configure my Ethernet interface on boot
1264 but these were documented in the client code and in the DHCP
1265 documentation from the Hungarian developer.</para>
1266
1267 <para>I'm a poorly skilled UNIX programmer but it was
1268 immediately obvious to me how to incrementally extend the DHCP client
1269 code (the feeling was exhilarating and addictive).</para>
1270
1271 <para>Additionally, due directly to GPL + having the full development
1272 environment in front of me, I was in a position where I could write up
1273 my changes and e-mail them out within a couple of hours (in contrast
1274 to how things like this would get done in NT). Engaging in that
1275 process would have prepared me for a larger, more ambitious Linux
1276 project in the future <footnote><para>29. Vinod Vallopillil, <ulink
1277 url="http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloween2.html">Linux OS
1278 Competitive Analysis (Halloween II).</ulink> Note Vallopillil's
1279 surprise that a program written in California had been subsequently
1280 documented by a programmer in Hungary.</para>
1281 </footnote>.</para></blockquote>
1282
1283 <para>"The feeling was exhilarating and addictive." Stop the presses:
1284 Microsoft experimentally verifies Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to
1285 Faraday's Law. Wrap the Internet around every brain on the planet and
1286 spin the planet. Software flows in the wires. It's an emergent
1287 property of human minds to create. "Due directly to the GPL," as
1288 Vallopillil rightly pointed out, free software made available to him
1289 an exhilarating increase in his own creativity, of a kind not
1290 achievable in his day job working for the Greatest Programming Company
1291 on Earth. If only he had e-mailed that first addictive fix, who knows
1292 where he'd be now?</para>
1293
1294 <para>So, in the end, my dwarvish friends, it's just a human thing.
1295 Rather like why Figaro sings, why Mozart wrote the music for him to
1296 sing to, and why we all make up new words: Because we can. Homo
1297 ludens, meet Homo faber. The social condition of global
1298 interconnection that we call the Internet makes it possible for all of
1299 us to be creative in new and previously undreamed-of ways. Unless we
1300 allow "ownership" to interfere. Repeat after me, ye dwarves and men:
1301 Resist the resistance!</para>
1302
1303 </section>
1304 <!--<para><img src="anarchism_files/quad.gif"></para><a name="m4"></a>-->
1305
1306 <section>
1307 <title>IV. Their Lordships Die in the Dark?</title>
1308
1309 <para>For the IPdroid, fresh off the plane from a week at Bellagio
1310 paid for by Dreamworks SKG, it's enough to cause indigestion.</para>
1311
1312 <para>Unlock the possibilities of human creativity by connecting
1313 everyone to everyone else? Get the ownership system out of the way so
1314 that we can all add our voices to the choir, even if that means
1315 pasting our singing on top of the Mormon Tabernacle and sending the
1316 output to a friend? No one sitting slack-jawed in front of a televised
1317 mixture of violence and imminent copulation carefully devised to
1318 heighten the young male eyeball's interest in a beer commercial? What
1319 will become of civilization? Or at least of copyright teachers?</para>
1320
1321 <para>But perhaps this is premature. I've only been talking about
1322 software. Real software, the old kind, that runs computers. Not like
1323 the software that runs DVD players, or the kind made by the Grateful
1324 Dead. "Oh yes, the Grateful Dead. Something strange about them, wasn't
1325 there? Didn't prohibit recording at their concerts. Didn't mind if
1326 their fans rather riled the recording industry. Seem to have done all
1327 right, though, you gotta admit. Senator Patrick Leahy, isn't he a
1328 former Deadhead? I wonder if he'll vote to extend corporate authorship
1329 terms to 125 years, so that Disney doesn't lose The Mouse in 2004. And
1330 those DVD players - they're computers, aren't they?"</para>
1331
1332 <para>In the digital society, it's all connected. We can't depend for
1333 the long run on distinguishing one bitstream from another in order to
1334 figure out which rules apply. What happened to software is already
1335 happening to music. Their recording industry lordships are now
1336 scrambling wildly to retain control over distribution, as both
1337 musicians and listeners realize that the middlepeople are no longer
1338 necessary. The Great Potemkin Village of 1999, the so-called Secure
1339 Digital Music Initiative, will have collapsed long before the first
1340 Internet President gets inaugurated, for simple technical reasons as
1341 obvious to those who know as the ones that dictated the triumph of
1342 free software <footnote> <para>30. See "They're Playing Our Song: The
1343 Day the Music Industry Died," in <emphasis>The Invisible Barbecue</emphasis>,
1344 forthcoming.</para> </footnote> . The anarchist revolution in music is
1345 different from the one in software <emphasis>tout court</emphasis>, but here too -
1346 as any teenager with an MP3 collection of self-released music from
1347 unsigned artists can tell you - theory has been killed off by the
1348 facts. Whether you are Mick Jagger, or a great national artist from
1349 the third world looking for a global audience, or a garret-dweller
1350 reinventing music, the recording industry will soon have nothing to
1351 offer you that you can't get better for free. And music doesn't sound
1352 worse when distributed for free, pay what you want directly to the
1353 artist, and don't pay anything if you don't want to. Give it to your
1354 friends; they might like it.</para>
1355
1356 <para>
1357 What happened to music is also happening to news. The wire services,
1358 as any U.S. law student learns even before taking the near-obligatory
1359 course in Copyright for Droids, have a protectible property interest
1360 in their expression of the news, even if not in the facts the news
1361 reports <footnote><para>31. International News Service v. Associated
1362 Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). With regard to the actual terse, purely
1363 functional expressions of breaking news actually at stake in the
1364 jostling among wire services, this was always a distinction only a
1365 droid could love.</para></footnote>. So why are they now giving all
1366 their output away? Because in the world of the Net, most news is
1367 commodity news. And the original advantage of the news gatherers, that
1368 they were internally connected in ways others were not when
1369 communications were expensive, is gone. Now what matters is collecting
1370 eyeballs to deliver to advertisers. It isn't the wire services that
1371 have the advantage in covering Kosovo, that's for sure. Much less
1372 those paragons of "intellectual" property, their television
1373 lordships. They, with their overpaid pretty people and their massive
1374 technical infrastructure, are about the only organizations in the
1375 world that can't afford to be everywhere all the time. And then they
1376 have to limit themselves to ninety seconds a story, or the eyeball
1377 hunters will go somewhere else. So who makes better news, the
1378 propertarians or the anarchists? We shall soon see.</para>
1379
1380 <para>Oscar Wilde says somewhere that the problem with socialism is
1381 that it takes up too many evenings. The problems with anarchism as a
1382 social system are also about transaction costs. But the digital
1383 revolution alters two aspects of political economy that have been
1384 otherwise invariant throughout human history. All software has zero
1385 marginal cost in the world of the Net, while the costs of social
1386 coordination have been so far reduced as to permit the rapid formation
1387 and dissolution of large-scale and highly diverse social groupings
1388 entirely without geographic limitation <footnote> <para>32. See "No
1389 Prodigal Son: The Political Theory of Universal Interconnection," in
1390 <emphasis>The Invisible Barbecue</emphasis>, forthcoming.</para> </footnote> . Such
1391 fundamental change in the material circumstances of life necessarily
1392 produces equally fundamental changes in culture. Think not? Tell it to
1393 the Iroquois. And of course such profound shifts in culture are
1394 threats to existing power relations. Think not? Ask the Chinese
1395 Communist Party. Or wait 25 years and see if you can find them for
1396 purposes of making the inquiry.</para>
1397
1398 <para>In this context, the obsolescence of the IPdroid is neither
1399 unforseeable nor tragic. Indeed it may find itself clanking off into
1400 the desert, still lucidly explaining to an imaginary room the
1401 profitably complicated rules for a world that no longer exists. But at
1402 least it will have familiar company, recognizable from all those
1403 glittering parties in Davos, Hollywood, and Brussels. Our Media Lords
1404 are now at handigrips with fate, however much they may feel that the
1405 Force is with them. The rules about bitstreams are now of dubious
1406 utility for maintaining power by co-opting human creativity. Seen
1407 clearly in the light of fact, these Emperors have even fewer clothes
1408 than the models they use to grab our eyeballs. Unless supported by
1409 user-disabling technology, a culture of pervasive surveillance that
1410 permits every reader of every "property" to be logged and charged, and
1411 a smokescreen of droid-breath assuring each and every young person
1412 that human creativity would vanish without the benevolent aristocracy
1413 of BillG the Creator, Lord Murdoch of Everywhere, the Spielmeister and
1414 the Lord High Mouse, their reign is nearly done. But what's at stake
1415 is the control of the scarcest resource of all: our
1416 attention. Conscripting that makes all the money in the world in the
1417 digital economy, and the current lords of the earth will fight for
1418 it. Leagued against them are only the anarchists: nobodies, hippies,
1419 hobbyists, lovers, and artists. The resulting unequal contest is the
1420 great political and legal issue of our time. Aristocracy looks hard
1421 to beat, but that's how it looked in 1788 and 1913 too. It is, as Chou
1422 En-Lai said about the meaning of the French Revolution, too soon to
1423 tell.</para>
1424
1425 </section>
1426 <section>
1427 <title>About the Author</title>
1428
1429 <para>Eben Moglen is Professor of Law &amp; Legal History, Columbia Law School.
1430 E-mail: <ulink url="mailto:moglen@columbia.edu">Mail: moglen@columbia.edu</ulink></para>
1431
1432 <para>Acknowledgments</para>
1433
1434 <para>This paper was prepared for delivery at the Buchmann
1435 International Conference on Law, Technology and Information, at Tel
1436 Aviv University, May 1999; my thanks to the organizers for their kind
1437 invitation. I owe much as always to Pamela Karlan for her insight and
1438 encouragement. I especially wish to thank the programmers throughout
1439 the world who made free software possible.</para>
1440
1441
1442 <blockquote>
1443 <para>
1444 <ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/index.html"><!--<img src="anarchism_files/contents.gif" alt="Contents" align="bottom" border="0">--></ulink> </para>
1445 <para>
1446 <ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/issues/index.html"><!--<img src="anarchism_files/index.gif" alt="Index" border="0">--></ulink>
1447 </para>
1448 <para>Copyright <ulink url="http://firstmonday.org/copy.html">©</ulink> 1999, First Monday</para></blockquote>
1449
1450
1451 </section>
1452</article>
Note: See TracBrowser for help on using the repository browser.