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2<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN" "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
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4
5<article>
6<sect1 id="pirates">
7<title>ГЛАВА ЧЕТИРИ „Пирати“</title>
8
9<para><emphasis role="strong">Ако <quote>пиратсване</quote>
10означава</emphasis> да използваш творческата собственост на други без
11тяхното позволение — ако е вярно, че <quote>правото е на страната на
12това с цена</quote>, то историята на индустрията на съдържанието е
13история на пиратското движение. Всеки важен дял от <quote>големите
14медии</quote> днес — филми, звукозапис, радио и кабелната телевизия —
15всичко това е бивало пораждано от някакъв вид пиратство според горната
16дефиниция. Една и съща формула се повтаря досега — последните пирати
17се присъеиняват към елитния клуб на избраните, но това няма да се
18повтори отново.</para>
19
20<sect2 id="film">
21
22<title>Фимлите</title>
23
24<para>Филмовата индустрия на Холивуд е съградена от пирати-бегълци.
25<footnote><para>
26<!-- f1 -->
27Благодарен съм на
28<personname><firstname>Питър</firstname>
29<surname>Димауро</surname></personname>, че ме насочи към тази
30необикновена история. Виж също — <author><firstname>Сива</firstname>
31<surname>Вайдхянатан</surname></author>, <quote>Авторски правини и
32кривини</quote>, 87-93, в която са описани
33<quote>приключенията</quote> на
34<personname><surname>Едисон</surname></personname> с авторските права
35и патентите.</para></footnote>
36
37Част от причините творците и режисьорите да мигрират от източното
38крайбрежие към Калифорния в началото на двадесети век е да избягат от
39контрола, които патентите са гарантирали на изобретателя на правенето
40на филми — <personname><firstname>Томас</firstname>
41<surname>Едисон</surname> </personname>. Контролът е бил осъществяван
42от монополен <quote>тръст</quote> — Компанията за филмови патенти
43(<acronym>КФП</acronym>) и са се основавали на творческата собственост
44на <personname><firstname>Томас</firstname> <surname>Едисон</surname>
45</personname> — патентите. Едисон основава КФП, за да упражнява
46правата гарантирани му от творческата му собственост, а КФП здравата е
47упражнявала контрола, който е изисквала. Ето как един коментатор
48описва част от историята:
49
50<blockquote><para>Беше поставен краен срок за всички компании да
51влязат в унисон с лиценза — януари 1909г. С идването на февруари,
52нелицензираните организации, които се оказват извън закона, но се
53обявиха за независими организации започнха протести срещу тръста и
54продължиха своя бизнес без да се поддават на монолопа на Едисон. През
55лятото на 1909г. движението на независимите беше набрало сила и
56продуцентите и собствениците на коносалони използваха незаконна
57апаратура и внасяха филмови материали, за да създадат свой, nelegalen
58пазар. "С течение на огромното разширяване на броя на евтините кина,
59Патентната компания отговори на движението на независимите като
60създаде дъщерна компания за грубите задачи, която е известна като
61General Film Company (Обща филмова компания), която да блокира
62навлизането на нелицензираните независими организации. Чрез методи на
63принуждаване, които станаха легендарни, General Film конфискува
64нелицензирана техника, спираше доставките на филми, към киносалоните,
65които показват нелицензирани филми и ефективно монополизира
66разпространението чрез придобиването на всички борси за филми в САЩ с
67изключение на притежаваната от Уилиям Фокс, който не зачита тръста
68дори и след като тръста прекратява лиценза му."
69<footnote><para>
70<!-- f2 -->
71J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
72Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
73posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
74Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
75<ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
76                discussion
77of the economic motive behind both these limits and the limits
78imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From Edison
79to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the
80                Propertization
81of Copyright" (September 2002), University of Chicago Law
82School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper
83No. 159.
84</para></footnote>
85
86</para></blockquote>
87<para>
88Напстърите на онези дни - "независимите" са били компании като Фокс. И
89също както днес - на независимите им интензивно се е
90пречело. "Снимачният процес е бил прекъсван от кражби на съоръжение,
91често се случвали и "инциденти" при които има загуба на негативи,
92апаратура, сгради и понякога на крайници и човешки живот."
93
94<footnote><para>
95<!-- f3 -->
96Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
97
98<ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
99</para></footnote>
100
101Всичко
102това кара независимите организации да напуснат източното
103крайбрежие. Калифорния се оказва достатъчно отдалечена от обсега на
104Едисон, за да могат производителите на филми да пиратсват неговите
105изобретения, без да се боят от закона. Лидерите на холивидското коно,
106и най вече Фокс, са правили именно това. Естествено - Калифорняи се
107разраства бързо и реалното прилагане на федералния закон най-накрая се
108разпростира на запад. Но понеже патентите дават на патентопритежателя
109наистина "ограничен" монопол (едва 16 години по това време) докато се
110появят достатъчно федерални шерифи се появят, патентите са
111зитекли. Една нова индустрия се ражда, и това отчасти се дължи на
112кражбата на творческата собственост на Едисон.
113</para>
114</para>
115</sect2>
116
117<sect2 id="recordedmusic">
118<title>Recorded Music</title>
119<para>
120The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
121how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
122</para>
123<para>
124At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
125for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
126piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
127their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
128their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
1291899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
130to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
131right to perform it publicly.
132</para>
133<para>
134But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's
135phonograph or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was
136clear enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that
137I performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
138would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
139                recording.
140But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a "public
141                performance"
142if I recorded the song in my own house (even today, you don't
143owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in the shower), or if I
144recorded the song from memory (copies in your brain are not--yet--
145regulated by copyright law). So if I simply sang the song into a
146                recording
147device in the privacy of my own home, it wasn't clear that I owed the
148composer anything. And more importantly, it wasn't clear whether I
149owed the composer anything if I then made copies of those recordings.
150Because of this gap in the law, then, I could effectively pirate someone
151else's song without paying its composer anything.
152</para>
153<para>
154The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
155<!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
156this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
157put it,
158</para>
159<blockquote>
160<para>
161Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
162opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
163copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and
164                companies
165who cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain
166of the composer and publisher without any regard for [their] rights.<footnote><para>
167<!-- f4 -->
168To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
169S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
170Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge, of
171South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
172Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
173                Hackensack,
174N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
175</para></footnote>
176</para>
177</blockquote>
178<para>
179The innovators who developed the technology to record other
180people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
181genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
182<!-- f5 -->
183To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
184                (statement
185of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
186</para></footnote>
187and the "music publishing industry"
188was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
189<!-- f6 -->
190To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
191                (statement
192of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
193</para></footnote>
194As John Philip
195Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
196out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
197<!-- f7 -->
198To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
199                (statement
200of John Philip Sousa, composer).
201</para></footnote>
202</para>
203<para>
204These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So,
205too, do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who
206                developed
207the player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
208introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any
209                composer
210of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the
211                machines
212increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
213<!-- f8 -->
214To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283­84
215(statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
216                Perforating
217Company of New York).
218</para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
219argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
220public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
221about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
222Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
223ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."<footnote><para>
224<!-- f9 -->
225To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376
226                (prepared
227memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
228                American
229Graphophone Company Association).
230</para></footnote>
231</para>
232<para>
233The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
234the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
235composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
236music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
237                control
238over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
239recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
240once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
241
242<!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
243copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
244                authorizes
245a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
246song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
247</para>
248<para>
249American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
250refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
251key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
252Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
253                recordings
254so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
255by the statute.
256</para>
257<para>
258This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
259writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham
260gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge
261                whatever
262he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is
263thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no
264permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of Grisham.
265</para>
266<para>
267But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
268thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind
269of piracy--by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
270gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
271work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are
272the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets
273something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets
274access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
275was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
276the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would
277                stifle
278follow-on creativity.<footnote><para>
279<!-- f10 -->
280Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
281H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
282sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
283in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
284Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
285</para></footnote>
286</para>
287<para>
288While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
289historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
290records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
291relates,
292</para>
293<blockquote>
294<para>
295the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
296<!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
297license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
298        industry
299is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
300                importance
301in the United States and throughout the world; records
302today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
303creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
304                access
305to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
306the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
307before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
308as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
309rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
310recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
311                improved
312quality, and a greater choice.<footnote><para>
313<!-- f11 -->
314Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House
315                Committee
316on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83,
317(8 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention
318to this report.
319</para></footnote>
320</para>
321</blockquote>
322<para>
323By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
324                creative
325work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
326</para>
327</sect2>
328<sect2 id="radio">
329<title>Radio</title>
330<para>
331Radio was also born of piracy.
332</para>
333<para>
334When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
335"public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
336<!-- f12 -->
337See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning, record
338companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
339                messages
340purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
341Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
342record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA
343                Manufacturing
344Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1940). See also Randal C.
345Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
346Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law
347Review 70 (2003): 281.
348</para></footnote>
349As I described above,
350the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
351public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the
352                composer
353money for that performance.
354</para>
355<para>
356But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
357a copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
358copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
359                Birthday"
360sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to
361have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
362is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio
363                station.
364And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
365have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the
366                composer
367of the music for his work.
368
369<!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
370</para>
371<para>
372But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
373                radio
374station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
375need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
376                something
377for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
378free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
379playing the song.
380</para>
381<para>
382This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
383                music.
384Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
385public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
386song in public, she has to get your permission.
387</para>
388<para>
389Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
390then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
391hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
392some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
393the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
394"protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
395Madonna's work without paying her anything.
396</para>
397<para>
398No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
399benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
400performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
401                ordinarily
402gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
403choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
404something for nothing.
405</para>
406</sect2>
407<sect2 id="cabletv">
408<title>Cable TV</title>
409<para>
410
411Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
412</para>
413<para>
414When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with
415cable television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the
416                content
417that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable
418                companies
419started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
420<!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
421for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
422        broadcasters'
423content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever did--
424Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to give away.
425</para>
426<para>
427Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
428Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
429"unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
430<!-- f13 -->
431Copyright Law Revision--CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
432                Subcommittee
433on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
434                Committee
435on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966) (statement of
436Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission).
437</para></footnote>
438There may have
439been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable TV, but as
440                Douglas
441Anello, general counsel to the National Association of
442                Broadcasters,
443asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
444interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
445<!-- f14 -->
446Copyright Law Revision--CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
447general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
448</para></footnote>
449As another broadcaster put it,
450</para>
451<blockquote>
452<para>
453The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
454only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
455paid for.<footnote><para>
456<!-- f15 -->
457Copyright Law Revision--CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
458general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
459</para></footnote>
460</para>
461</blockquote>
462<para>
463Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable
464enough:
465</para>
466<blockquote>
467<para>
468All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
469take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
470piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
471think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
472<!-- f16 -->
473Copyright Law Revision--CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
474Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
475United Artists Television, Inc.).
476</para></footnote>
477</para>
478</blockquote>
479<para>
480These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president
481                Charlton
482Heston said, who were "depriving actors of compensation."<footnote><para>
483<!-- f17 -->
484Copyright Law Revision--CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
485president of the Screen Actors Guild).
486</para></footnote>
487</para>
488<para>
489But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant
490                Attorney
491General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
492</para>
493<blockquote>
494<para>
495Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have
496any copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether
497                copyright
498holders who are already compensated, who already have a
499monopoly, should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
500
501<!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
502question here is how much compensation they should have and
503how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
504<!-- f18 -->
505Copyright Law Revision--CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
506                Zimmerman,
507acting assistant attorney general).
508</para></footnote>
509</para>
510</blockquote>
511<para>
512Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the
513Supreme Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright
514owners nothing.
515</para>
516<para>
517It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
518of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
519In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
520                resolved
521the question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable
522companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but
523the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright owner.
524The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't exercise veto
525power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable companies thus
526built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value created by
527                broadcasters'
528content.
529</para>
530<para>
531These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy"
532means using value from someone else's creative property without
533                permission
534from that creator--as it is increasingly described today<footnote><para>
535<!-- f19 -->
536See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine of Free
537Expression: Copyright on the Internet--The Myth of Free Information,
538                available
539at
540<ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The threat of piracy--the use of someone else's creative
541work without permission or compensation--has grown with the Internet."
542</para></footnote>
543--
544then  every  industry affected by copyright today is the product and
545beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio, cable
546TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every generation
547welcomes the pirates from the last. Every generation--until now.
548</para>
549<!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
550</sect2>
551</sect1>
552
553</article>
554
555
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